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Chapter 1 "Citizens and Denizens: Civic Engagement in the Nation-State" 
 Residents of a community make a point of shopping at locally owned businesses or 
patronizing restaurants using organically grown food. Chanting students gather outside the 
university president's office, demanding a response to their objections about a curriculum 
change. A small crowd stands on a street corner, holding signs that call for peace and urge 
motorists to honk in support.  
 Examples like these surround us. Individuals use a variety of means - protest, personal 
choices, public discourse of all varieties -  to share and act on their convictions. Often individuals 
make these expressions of conviction about what they most immediately experience, because 
they occupy a particular place. Although they may engage with questions of national or global 
importance - such as questions of resource use, economic policy, the rights of marginalized 
groups, the responsibilities of one group of people to another - they engage with these questions 
from a specific location, and from a particular class, heritage, or ideology They respond to these 
questions as people who are from a particular place, physically and metaphorically. They want to 
create change around them, or they want to work with others near them to create change 
elsewhere.  
 We do not always recognize examples like those above as the acts of concerned citizens, 
however. Instead, responses are as varied as the examples themselves. Some of their fellow 
citizens are apathetic in response, others are inspired or approving, and still others are irritated or 
hostile. These responses often seem disconnected from the acts of public discourse themselves, 
though, and are more likely to be prompted by our feelings about the content. Our admiration 
and irritation have more to do with what we think of the convictions of the individuals than with 
what we think of their actions. If we express sympathy for protesters or a movement, it stems 
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more from our shared ambivalence or opposition toward the object of their protest or support, 
than because we value protest itself as a means of expression. And when we disagree with the 
convictions of these individuals, we often dismiss their arguments or demands entirely and focus 
only on the inconvenience of disruptiveness of their actions. 
 This dismissal is possible, because normally when we think of citizenship, we imagine a 
collection of rights regulated and upheld by official institutions. Under this definition, acts like 
those opening this chapter may well count as expressions of conviction, but they do not 
necessarily count as performances of citizenship. In contrast to this definition, I argue that what 
it means to be a citizen is best understood as the ability and desire to work on public problems 
with others. In what follows, I will discuss the modern citizen as a concept that grows out of and 
exists in relationship to the nation-state. Although the nation-state is defined by borders, by 
place, it has led to a citizenship in which the concrete place of the "state" is often swept aside in 
favor of the abstract place of the "nation." The nation-state as we know it, however, is changing 
under the conditions of globalization, and in spite of the potential for citizenship to evolve 
alongside the changing nation-state, our official definitions of citizenship are still most likely to 
emphasize the nation, to manifest through institutions. I will describe as well what this 
institutional citizenship looks like and suggest some of the ways that these institutions are 
inadequate for our lived experience of citizenship. In this project, I look closely at three 
examples - consumption, protest, and revolution - which will serve as the case studies for 
investigating citizenship. In these examples, as with those that open this chapter, the individuals 
involved act not as citizens of an abstract nation, but as residents in a particular place, seeking 
solutions or change. Finally, I want to look at how my field, rhetoric, has viewed citizenship and 
discuss some of the implications for my project. How we understand citizenship seems 
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increasingly important today, as a general cry of dismay goes up bemoaning low voter turnout, 
and politically disengaged young people. I would not be the first to suggest that civic 
participation, rather than declining, has simply stepped to the side. If this is so, it seems crucial 
that we be able to recognize alternative possibilities for civic engagement, rather than dismissing 
them.  
MODERN CITIZENSHIP 
 Current notions of the citizen are tied to the nation-state, the birth of which is often traced 
to the peace of Westphalia, the name given to the treaties signed in 1648 after the Thirty Years 
War. This treaty renders all states legally equal, requiring that they recognize both the boundaries 
of other states and the rights of other states within those boundaries. In doing so, states agree to 
take a non-interventionist approach to the internal affairs of their fellow states, and accept that 
they will receive the same treatment in turn. The nation-state is thus defined by boundaries; it 
relies on them both  as a concept and as a physical space. In her work on nation-states, Saskia 
Sassen argues that they are assemblages of territory, authority, and rights, but calls territory "the 
most crucial capability" for the formation of the nation-state ("Neither global" 69). Carlo 
Bordoni describes the nation-state as the combination of an abstract "nation" with a concrete 
"state." The nation is often defined by a shared culture, language or languages, and way of life, 
but the members of a nation seek to exercise autonomy and freedom of movement "within that 
space that they feel belongs to them." This space that belongs to them is the state. As Bordoni 
puts it, "Nationhood is a feeling or state of mind, but the state - more pragmatically - needs a 
territory in which to take root." The citizen both belongs to that territory and shares the culture of 
others within it, is both of that state and of that nation. 
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 It is unsurprising, then, that our definitions of citizenship within the nation-state are 
rooted in what we do within the territory which belongs to us, or which we belong to. To be born 
in a place, or to be born to parents who are from a place, is usually sufficient to attain automatic 
citizenship. Rather than undergoing a process of becoming a citizen, often we are simply granted 
automatic citizenship as a result of being born within these recognized boundaries. This is a 
departure from the thoughts of scholars like Aristotle, who argues in the Politics that citizenship 
is about both place and participation. Even he, though, is quick to establish that "the power to 
take part in the deliberative or judicial administration of the state" is a power that confers 
citizenship  only in "that state" (Bk. 3, Pt. 1). Once outside the borders, or once stripped of that 
power, the individual ceases to be a citizen. The citizen, like the state, needs a place to play out. 
 For this reason, the citizen is often set in contrast to the denizen - who, while also 
residing in a particular territory, may not enjoy the same rights or have access to the same 
opportunities to take part in governing the state. Questions of immigration often invoke the 
denizen as someone who occupies a particular location while enjoying only limited rights and 
privileges. As Rachel Ida Buff argues, the evolution of the citizen is in many ways defined by 
those who do not hold citizenship, "those who do not benefit from its protections and rights" (8). 
If the denizen sometimes appears as someone unable to take part in decision-making, though, the 
term is also used to describe those who choose not to make full use of the rights and protections 
afforded by citizenship. In a 2013 piece in The Seattle Star, Omar Willey claims that while 
Seattle is awash in denizens, citizens are thin on the ground. Increasingly, he argues, we "fail to 
become citizens," choosing to "simply exist in a city," rather than accepting the allegiance and 
responsibilities that would mean full citizenship. To suggest that the denizen is a "failed" or 
"lazy" citizen is problematic, but what I'm concerned with here is Willey's sense that both exist 
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as members of the same territory, differing only in what they are able to do or choose to do. The 
two shape one another, and the point at which they meet is the place they share. 
  A more positive view of the denizen might be that of Freeman House, who defines the 
citizen as a "creature of the invented world," while the denizen is "a participant in unfolding 
creation" (qtd. in Babcock). He uses this distinction to discuss the denizen's superior integration 
into its environment, its greater awareness of the reality underneath the "invented world." The 
invented world contains institutions rather than natural forces, and operates with boundaries that 
are at times arbitrary - while the citizen sees state or national borders, the denizen knows that 
these lines may be meaningless in an ecological or geographic sense. In questions of 
development, or responsible use of resources, it is the denizen who is best placed to see that 
NIMBY is useless - the backyard is another invented boundary, one not recognized by 
contamination and other forms of environmental destruction.  
 Even for House, though, inside the realm of the invented world, it is the citizen  "who 
makes the decisions: about land use and zoning, how we care for and protect each other;" in 
short, the citizen determines the shape of the invented world. While the denizen may have more 
awareness of their environment, the invented world cannot be simply dismissed - the effects of 
elections, ordinances, building permits, and boundaries have very real consequences, both good 
and bad, on "unfolding creation." As with Bordoni's definition of the nation-state above, both the 
abstract and the concrete are in play here, and the invented world of the nation shapes the 
concrete world of the state. 
DESTABILIZED BORDERS 
 If citizenship is tied to the existence of the nation-state, though, it stands to reason that a 
change in one will ripple through the other, and many scholars have described the destabilizing 
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effects of globalization on the nation-state. Bordoni argues that the idea of a "national 
community" is called into question as "security, defense of privilege, identity, recognition of 
culture" all become uncertain and fragmented. And Sassen argues that the privatization of 
formerly government-run services, and a general withdrawal away from the welfare-state model 
means that citizens may also feel greater distance from, and less loyalty to, a state that seems 
increasingly more interested in corporate individuals than the flesh and blood variety. This 
distance works in combination with a loss of privacy and security to undermine national identity. 
Whereas once citizens could feel relatively confident that they would be seen as loyal to the state 
even if resident aliens or immigrants were not, now all are monitored and all are suspect 
("Incompleteness" 232-3).  
 Moreover, the nation-state can no longer be said to consist of a shared culture, language, 
and way of life, if in fact it ever could. Diasporic communities, once thought of as exceptions, 
are increasingly common, while it is the "historically hegemonic" who retreat into homogenous 
suburbs and gated communities (Bordoni). Diasporic identities, dual citizenship, and evolving 
ideas about global human rights allow us to further remove ourselves from the national 
community. To claim that human rights exist on a global level allows us to appeal outside of the 
state for satisfaction or justice. It also throws a wrench in an already-shaky policy of non-
intervention, as both genuinely concerned and self-interested parties seek to justify military 
action (like the US-led war in Iraq approved by the U.N. in 1991) in the name of 
humanitarianism.  
 Further breakdown in the policy of non-intervention also underscores ways that not just 
the nation as an idea or feeling but also the state as a physical territory has become porous. The 
boundaries of states have never posed much of an obstacle to the ruling classes, but the 
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deepening and widening of transnational ties under neoliberal globalization has further reduced 
the barriers of borders (Harvey 35). Capital, information, and jobs move fluidly from one place 
to another, as does labor, although boundaries remain more solid for those outside the ruling 
classes. While territory may continue to define the state in our minds, the absolute authority 
understood to reign within that territory is no longer assured. Human rights groups seek to 
establish global rights above and beyond those allowed by the state, and multinational 
corporations work with governments to gain authority at the sites of their overseas operations. 
States are also increasingly subject to entities such as the WTO or the IMF, which cut across the 
division between national and global, as do attempts to regulate global capitalism and limit its 
exploitation of workers and resources.  
 The end result is that citizenship and its relationship to place have become increasingly 
fraught. House's division makes the citizen the inhabitant not of a real place, but of an invented 
world. Although definitions of citizenship often tie it explicitly to place, these ties to place often 
come down to paperwork establishing where we were born, where we are licensed to drive a car 
or practice a trade, where we own property or work, where we are registered to vote. The denizen 
may live in the state, but only the citizen is a resident of the nation. As the nation-state is 
destabilized, citizenship is likewise destabilized. The nation is moving away from the state, and 
as it does, what it means to be a citizen is increasingly defined more by our legal and political 
rights than by our participation in a shared culture. T. H. Marhsall's 1950 definition of 
citizenship, one of the most commonly referenced, breaks citizenship down into three elements: 
legal citizenship, civic citizenship, and social citizenship. For Marshall, legal rights are 
important, as is the ability Aristotle mentions to participate in the administration of the state, 
either by holding office or by voting on those who will, but citizens must have not only the 
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ability but also the opportunity to participate in order to be full citizens. Without social 
citizenship, the education, time, and means to make use of legal and civic citizenship, citizens 
cannot fully participate. For Marshall, though, location means little, except in the sense that 
being in a place (a democracy rather than a monarchy or authoritarian state, for instance, or 
living in one country over another) gives us access to these rights. David Fleming argues in City 
of Rhetoric that when we imagine citizenship we tend to conjure up an image of "the ordinary 
man or woman who is, by right, a full and equal member of the polity, who enjoys its benefits 
and shares in its governance, participates in its decision making, serves in its military, sits on its 
juries, and obeys its laws (without ever giving up his or her right to complain and dispute)" (19). 
Location exists here largely in the phrase "by right," inasmuch as it is likely to be residence in a 
place or descent from a place that bestows all else.  
THE INSTIUTIONS OF CITIZENSHIP 
 Fleming  suggests that we've been seduced by placelessness, and through this seduction 
we've bought into a citizenship that seems to promise equality but delivers impotence. In the 
United States and other democracies, citizenship is often composed of specific procedures or 
institutions. The responsibilities we hold toward the deliberative and judicial administration of 
the state tend to translate into voting, paying taxes, jury duty, military service - in short, 
responsibilities to institutions, often the same institutions that uphold and protect our rights. In 
dealing with these institutions, we believe we will all be treated the same: we will all receive the 
same drivers' test, and all receive one vote at our polling station. As mentioned above, Marshall 
was greatly concerned with the social aspect of citizenship, but even for him that aspect is 
largely managed through institutions - financial aid for struggling families, worker protection, 
adequate education for even the poorest children - so that all can interact knowledgeably and 
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responsibly with the institutions of legal and civic citizenship. Marshall was optimistic in 1950 
that as more institutions arose, all three aspects of citizenship would be available to everyone, 
and that finally we might approach a society leaving no one out.  
 For most people, however, institutional citizenship is too big, too remote, and happens 
most often at the level of the nation. As Fleming argues, "In large, diverse societies, ruled by 
professional politicians and powerful interests, managed by technical experts, and supervised by 
the mass media, the issues of public debate are huge, complex, and attention-grabbing; conflicts 
are stark, and heated, and considerable resources are available to deal with them. But as lively as 
all this is, it can seem remote from the point of view of the individual citizen, who is usually 
little more than a spectator of it" (38). While it may seem as if citizens are engaging with 
difference and conflict when they participate at the national level, they often participate 
indirectly, sometimes by casting a vote (depending on the issue and the citizen) but more often 
simply by having an opinion on it all as they wait for events to play out. This lack of engagement 
with difference, moreover, means that institutional citizenship is both very large and very, very 
small. Because it happens so remotely, citizens watch issues unfold rather than participating in 
creating the conversation around those issues, and end by focusing on their own opinion, and 
their own vote. 
 Citizens have more power, to participate and to create change, at the local level, in 
smaller publics, but these publics often suffer from a lack of diversity, as well as limited power 
over the events that most concern citizens (Fleming 38). Running for local office or participating 
in town hall meetings allows citizens to feel more engaged, but in doing so they are less likely to 
encounter individuals and groups "not like" themselves. Moreover, while they may be able to 
exercise control over local questions (whether to allow a big-box store to occupy a particular 
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location, for example), they can do little from this level about questions of development in 
general, even when that development happens in areas close enough to their own for direct 
impact. Because local politics is also governed largely by institutions and procedure, and these 
procedures do not necessarily allow the average citizen to influence large decisions, the sense of 
being embedded in place may be largely illusion.   
 In a quote of some length, Fleming spells out how ludicrous our quest for a placeless 
citizenship is, even when prompted by honorable goals. As he puts it, 
We want our public realm to be as open, accessible, and inclusive as possible, and 
political rights and responsibilities to be a function of laws and procedures rather than the 
attributes or attachments of particular, spatiotemporally situated men and women...As a 
citizen, in other words, the individual is lifted out of the particularities of his or her 
earthly position, drained of personal history, family resources, religious faith, and 
physical attributes, and transformed into a self-contained rational being, floating in a 
space of neutral laws and abstract procedures to which he or she has (apparently) 
assented. (21)  
 
Put this way, the idea that we could leave our particularities behind when we come before the 
government, or that it could deal with us as if we don't carry those particularities around with us, 
seems impossible, to say nothing of how often attempting to eliminate difference results only in a 
system that privileges those with no difference - citizens who are white, male, middle-class.  
 Even if we could isolate citizens from the conditions and attributes that shape them as 
individuals, this is not how most of us experience our citizenship. As the boundaries of national 
identities and nation-states have become porous, the boundaries of citizenship as it is understood 
today have also begun to bleed. Far from being limited to institutions, the proliferation of rights 
talk today means that the realm of the citizen has spread to cover more and more ground, so that 
" a dimension of citizenship has come to color everything" (Schudson 299). Moreover, even if 
institutions strip us of difference, many of us still come to those institutions with a particular 
orientation, or come to them at all, because of our difference. The attributes we wish to eliminate 
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are also what determine our faith in or skepticism about the power of voting, our belief or 
disbelief in the justice of the courts, our inclination or disinclination to join or support the 
military. Even in dealing with institutions, we remain situated.  
EXTRA-INSTITUTIONAL CITIZENSHIP 
 But we also enact citizenship through unofficial channels. Gerard Hauser points out in 
Vernacular Voices that while many of us do express ourselves through institutions, like voting, 
we are just as likely to participate through "exercising [our] buying power, demonstrations of 
sympathy or opposition, adornments of colored ribbon, debates in classrooms and on factory 
floors, speeches on library steps or letters to the editor, correspondence with public officials, and 
with other expressions of stance and judgment" (33). I would add to this list clothing choices, 
body modifications like tattoos, bumper stickers, eating habits, even where we choose to live.  
 Other scholars support the notion that citizenship, far from taking place in a remote, 
neutral realm, is something as situated as we are. Richard Marback argues that "Citizenship is 
experienced through action, an embodied activity of being in and moving about in a world filled 
with other people and many things," so that "what people do matters more for their 
understandings of themselves as citizens than the descriptions of citizenship given them by law" 
(Ch. 5). Danielle Allen says simply that "ordinary habits are the stuff of citizenship" (12). These 
scholars suggest that citizenship is both institutional and everyday, existing inside and outside of 
official channels. What all of the scholars above have in common is a belief that citizenship 
requires that we exercise judgment, and then take steps to communicate and act on that judgment 
with others.  
 In this project, three case studies examine the tension between citizenship as an ideal and 
citizenship as a lived experience. I examine situations where individuals perform their 
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citizenship both as members of an abstract nation that grants them political and legal rights, and 
as residents of a physical place. They operate, following House, as denizens rather than, or in 
addition to, citizens. I look closely at participation in buy-local movements, organized protest, 
and revolution as performances of citizenship, arguing that they should be recognized as such 
because they represent attempts to work with others on solutions to public problems. Examples 
from these categories demonstrate how fraught they can be, as performances of citizenship. In 
spite of attempts to boycott businesses like BP and Chick-Fil-A , and in spite of bumper stickers 
exhorting us to buy American, and the increasing number of buy-local movements, often 
personal choices about which businesses we patronize remain personal, and as such they are 
stripped of their political significance. We may have heard the phrase "vote with our dollars," but 
we do not necessarily attach the same importance to personal choices in consumption or 
patronage as we do to casting a vote. And while apathetic citizens of all parties are encouraged to 
make their voices heard at the polls, when those same citizens make their voices heard by taking 
to the streets it becomes unclear whether their actions are virtuous or merely a nuisance. The 
Occupy Wall Street movement illustrates this. For those who approved of the movement and 
what it stood for, Occupiers were exercising good citizenship, while those who disapproved 
regarded them as lazy and ungrateful, too busy whining in the streets with their iPhones to get 
jobs like the upstanding citizens they inconvenienced with their protests. These reactions suggest 
both that a good citizen who sympathizes with the movement *must* Occupy their city, and that 
a good citizen, no matter their sympathies, cannot possibly participate in Occupy. Taken 
together, these examples demonstrate how the shifting definition of citizenship becomes a way to 
dismiss forms of public discourse we disapprove of or disagree with.  
13 
 
 Chapter 2 looks at the Keep Louisville Weird movement in Louisville, KY. Although buy 
local movements are rooted in consumerism and stem in large part from economic concerns, the 
rhetoric used by and about these movements suggests that for participants, shopping locally is  an 
engagement with questions about what our cities should look like, and what our economic 
responsibilities as citizens are. I argue that limited ideas about the rhetorical situation in which 
KLW functions work to reduce advocates of the movement to consumers exercising individual 
preferences. Drawing on Jenny Rice’s model of rhetorical ecologies and Sara Ahmed's idea of 
"stickiness", I trace some of the ways KLW has influenced and been influenced by other markers 
of place, allowing it to function as a performance of citizen identity. 
 In the third chapter, I examine reactions to the 1999 demonstrations against the WTO in 
Seattle, WA, including news articles, accounts by participants, and Stuart Townsend's 2007 film 
Battle in Seattle. I argue that both sides get caught up in a “war of words,” where they form 
competing narratives about what happened during the demonstrations, who did (or failed to do), 
accomplished (or failed to accomplish) what. The rhetoric used by participants and supporters, 
including Townsend's film, paints demonstrators as heroes or warriors who triumphantly 
vanquished the WTO. The opposing side labels those who took to the streets childish and naive, 
or violent and criminal, arguing that they accomplished very little save property damage. Neither 
of these positions allows for a discussion of protest as an act of civic engagement, as the conflict 
is described using warlike language – to be expected perhaps, of the Battle in Seattle. Instead, I 
propose that conflict could be more productively viewed through Kenneth Burke’s notion of “co-
operative competition,” which involves a willingness to engage with dissenting voices 
respectfully, as participants who are open to being transformed through the conversation. While 
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some participants speak to experiencing this transformation, these moments are often lost in the 
rhetoric of warfare.  
 The final case study focuses on what is called the Arab Spring, the series of protests and 
revolutions starting in late 2010. In particular, I look at an artifact from The Economist, "The 
Shoe-Throwers' Index," which attempts to calculate and rank the instability of Arab League 
nations. I argue that the Index makes use of a rhetoric of predictability or mathematics which 
suggests that revolution is stimulus response. Under this logic, citizens are content when they 
receive certain rights and enjoy certain opportunities - a logic that in itself suggests that all 
citizens will respond similarly to circumstances. As a counter-example, I look at the rhetoric 
used on Wael Ghonim's Facebook page, "Kullena Khaled Said," which allows participants to be 
situated locally, while identifying with a larger pan-Arabic sentiment. Although they join the 
Index in arguing that citizens will not be content when they lack freedoms and opportunities, 
they use this information to make connections across the region. 
 The examples I have chosen for this project are arranged in order of increasingly 
inclusiveness - from Keep Louisville Weird's concern solely with Louisville (and an abbreviated 
version of Louisville, at that), to Seattle's concern both with global practices enabled by the 
WTO and with making a stand in this particular city, and finally to the pan-Arabic rhetoric used 
by participants of the Arab Spring. In all of these examples, participants act as members of a 
community, whether local or global, and they themselves are very clear about the civic-
mindedness of their actions. But as Willey's comments suggest, our discourse about citizenship is 
framed by an emphasis on the institutions of the nation, so that protesters in 1999 count as 
denizens, but only become citizens if (or when) they are voting regularly. As a result of the 
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rhetoric commonly used about citizenship, there is conflict as others try to account for the actions 
of those who operate outside of institutions. 
RHETORIC AND CITIZENSHIP 
 Rhetoric's interest in citizenship, and its connection to public deliberation, goes back to 
the beginning of the discipline. In an introduction to the works of Isocrates, Michael Gagarin 
describes the impact of rhetorical instruction on 5th and 4th century Greece by pointing out that 
the political and legal systems of the time required direct participation from a large number of 
citizens, which meant that "all important decisions were made by these large bodies, and the 
primary means of influencing these decisions was oratory" (xii).  The ability to speak 
persuasively, then, would have been crucial in influencing these important decisions. In the 
Politics, Aristotle defines the citizen, above all, as someone "who has the power to take part in 
the deliberative or judicial administration of the state" (Bk. 3, Pt. 1), explicitly connecting the 
idea of citizenship with access to forums for public speech. Early scholars and teachers in the 
rhetorical arts were concerned with teaching promising Athenians how to use oratory to gain 
political influence, but many were also concerned with creating not just good orators but good 
citizens as well - individuals who would utilize and respond to persuasive speech virtuously.  
 The question of rhetoric's role in fostering citizenship would also be taken up in Classical 
Roman rhetoric. Quintillian asks in the Institutio Oratoria whether it is necessarily true that 
rhetorical skill and civic virtue go hand in hand, a question that his predecessors had grappled 
with, and which still haunts scholars in rhetoric and composition today. Richard Lanham refers 
to this as the "Q Question," the question that everyone pursuing the study or transmission of the 
humanities must face: are good speakers also good people, and thus good citizens? In the 
Institutio Oratoria, Quintillian laments the possibility that eloquent speakers can be bad people, 
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saying that "if the powers of eloquence serve only to lend arms to crime, there can be nothing 
more pernicious than eloquence to public and private lives alike," and that Nature itself has 
betrayed us if "her greatest gift to man" (language) becomes "the accomplice of crime, the foe to 
innocency and the enemy of truth" (Quintillian 356-7). Ultimately, he determines that this cannot 
be the case and that not only should a good orator be a good man, but only a good man can 
become a skilled speaker - only a mind free of vice and guilt could sufficiently apply itself to 
mastering this greatest of gifts.  
 Many of those who follow Quintillian share his belief that rhetorical instruction can 
foster good citizenship, albeit for different reasons. The conversation about the connection 
between citizenship and deliberation, and the belief that instruction in the latter can lead to 
greater virtue in the former, continues today in the field of composition. In the 80s, James 
Berlin's "Rhetoric and Ideology in the Writing Class" criticizes what he calls "cognitive 
rhetoric," a means of writing instruction that he says teaches students to achieve goals without 
questioning them or the values they hold. While this is a far cry from Quintillian's insistence that 
rhetorical skill in and of itself is a virtuous thing, Berlin's argument is for a reform, not rejection, 
of rhetoric. Berlin promotes what he calls social epistemic rhetoric, through which (and through 
critical pedagogy) a number of scholars (among them Kenneth Burke, Lester Faigley, and Ira 
Shor) argue that rhetoric is a political act and should be used "for social change, not only to 
empower individual students or to provide access for underrepresented minorities, but to address 
explicitly in the composition class questions of political conviction and to work against 
inequities in society" (Durst 126). So while rhetorical instruction in and of itself might not make 
for good citizens, the right kind of instruction can be a force for social justice.  
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 Even scholars who are skeptical of critical pedagogy are often reluctant to dismiss its 
emphasis on the political nature of rhetoric. Both Richard Miller and Russel Durst highlight 
student resistance to critical pedagogy, and our obligation to prepare students for the job market 
as well as the picket line, but both also determine that it is possible to work toward both goals - 
to create both good job candidates and good citizens in the writing classroom. In a piece for 
College English, Amy Wan acknowledges that, given the connection between hard-working 
employees and dutiful citizens, while we don't all agree on what kind of citizens we're creating, 
or what kind we ought to create, composition instructors have had a hand in citizen creation all 
along, whether by promoting job skills or by promoting civic engagement.   
 Rhetoric's interest as a field has been not only in how rhetorical instruction fosters 
citizenship, but also in how our everyday ways of talking about citizenship and public problems 
influence our civic identities and actions. Many of these scholars suggest that there is a crisis of 
citizenship that can't be dismissed as voter apathy, but is a result of the language and institutions 
that shape citizenship. Dana Cloud argues that just as neoliberal policies have privatized services 
for citizens, therapeutic discourses have privatized our troubles. Rather than recognizing 
problems such as poverty, increasing unstable employment or unemployment,  or urban blight as 
systemic problems or social concerns, such language asks us to focus on ourselves, to manage or 
master our depression and anger as individuals rather than allowing it to drive us to demand 
change. She argues that this discourse damages civic engagement by framing problems such as 
racism or poverty as forces of nature, and encourages us to "retreat from the public struggle for 
even modest reforms in favor of private wound-licking" (160). Defining our hardships as 
immutable and encouraging  us to look first to ourselves for solutions not only stops us from 
asking if things could be otherwise or demanding change, but cuts us off from others - except as 
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members of a support group, all working as individuals on fixing themselves. Both deliberation 
and collectivity suffer.  
 Other scholars see a similar isolation. Fleming's City of Rhetoric says outright that our 
very communities are organized in ways that discourage us from interacting with one another. 
Sharon Crowley argues that adherents of opposing ideologies talk past one another, refusing to 
engage, and that many of us are increasingly reluctant to bring up controversial topics for fear of 
damaging relationships or making a scene. Brian Garsten makes a similar point, saying that as 
politics becomes increasingly dominated by like-minded people speaking only to each other, we 
become alienated and our trust in the power of persuasion or judgment suffers. Garsten even 
suggests that concerns about citizenship and concerns about rhetoric are similarly intertwined. 
He believes that modern skepticism about rhetoric is tied to "a crisis of confidence about citizens' 
capacity to exercise political judgment in public deliberations" (Garsten, Introduction). If citizens 
cannot be trusted to make good decisions, rhetoric's ability to persuade becomes dangerous. 
Rather than avoiding persuasion, though, he argues that we must tame it through familiarity and 
use. And like Cloud or Crowley, he believes that more, not less, deliberation is the way to 
increase civic participation, and that the field of rhetoric has something to contribute in showing 
us how to deliberate productively.  
 In approaching this project, I have brought the questions and concerns of my field with 
me. Like many writing instructors, I see a civic dimension to my work in the classroom. The 
definition of citizenship I employ, that of being able and willing to engage with others about 
public problems, is a definition heavily influenced by scholars like those listed above. I am 
concerned as well with how the discourses around us shape our understanding of what it means 
to be a good citizen, or, as in the examples of the coming chapters, to be a citizen at all.  
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 And like them I believe that rhetoric has something to offer in showing us how to 
deliberate with one another. Far from being a means for manipulating an emotional and easily-
led citizenry (although to open the door to persuasion is obviously to risk allowing manipulation 
in as well), I consider rhetoric the best and most ethical hope for engaging with citizens. Rather 
than simply encouraging us to be rational or reasonable, and thus to go along with others, 
persuasion "requires us to engage with others wherever they stand and begin our argument there" 
(Garsten, Introduction, italics mine). Rhetoric is our best hope for a politics that doesn't alienate 
people or ignore their real lives. I argue that citizenship is situated - it is influenced by our 
everyday lives, and takes place through our everyday actions. Our situatedness means we will be 
different, and we will differ, and there will be conflict, if our democracy is inclusive enough to 
allow all to have a say. As scholars like Chantal Mouffe argue, if that conflict is to be productive, 
we would be best served by a agonistic relationship, where we see one another not as enemies, 
but as adversaries. It is rhetoric that can help us have these relationships, because it is rhetoric 
that encourages us to start where others are, encourages us to start at their situatedness when we 
try to persuade them, and which allows us to see others as fellow, even if dissenting, citizens 
rather than as enemies or criminals.  
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Chapter 2 Rhetorical Ecology in the "Keep Louisville Weird" Movement 
 Like any other Louisville teenager, I was aware that one of the coolest things you could 
do was walk up and down the section of Bardstown Road that runs through the Highlands. My 
memories of this neighborhood, an assemblage of funky old houses, set behind six or seven 
blocks of eccentric shops and restaurants, are likely comparable to those of other Louisville 
natives. As young adults, we roved up and down in packs, smoking and window shopping, 
occasionally buying something. I bought my first pair of drumsticks at The Doo-Wop Shop, had 
my first cup of coffee at the now-departed Twice Told Coffeehouse, and bought CDs at ear X-
tacy. 
 When, in 2003, I first saw the billboard that read “Keep Louisville Weird,” I thought 
immediately of ear X-tacy. Other than those words, the unsigned message said nothing, directed 
the reader nowhere. The words, however, used the same color scheme and font as ear X-tacy’s 
logo, so I immediately connected the billboard and the store. Soon enough, ear X-tacy customers 
who reached the same conclusion began to sport the bumper stickers and t-shirts they purchased 
at the record store, becoming ambulatory billboards. The phrase spread, along with the story 
behind it. Inspired by the success of the Keep Austin Weird campaign in Texas, ear X-tacy's 
owner, John Timmons, had called his own Crusade to keep Louisvillians from deserting stores 
like his in favor of chains like Best Buy, a decision prompted as much by his belief in the 
importance of stores like ear X-tacy to the community as from his desire to maintain his 
livelihood. 
 In what follows, I will discuss some of the arguments made for and about buy local 
movements such as Keep Louisville Weird. Taking Louisville as my case study, I will analyze 
rhetoric used by and about the movement. Although for some, Keep Louisville Weird functions 
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exclusively as a means to increase local sales, I believe that to examine it only in these terms 
relies on a simplification of the rhetorical situation. Jenny Edbauer Rice argues that previous 
notions of the rhetorical situation assume that elements such as audience or exigence are 
identifiable and firmly bounded. Instead, she suggests understanding public rhetoric as 
circulating in a network or ecology - models in which it can be difficult to identify any one 
element and in which public rhetoric can have unpredictable consequences. Her 2005 article, 
"Unframing Models of Public Distribution," takes as its example the buy-local movement in 
Austin, Texas which inspired Timmons to create Keep Louisville Weird.  While Rice is 
interested in using Keep Austin Weird to demonstrate the difficulty of locating discrete elements 
of a rhetorical situation and to demonstrate what an ecological approach might look like, I am 
using her work in combination with Sara Ahmed's notion of the "stickiness" of signs to trace 
some of the ways that Keep Louisville Weird influences and is influenced by other examples of 
public rhetoric. Changing how we view the rhetorical situation allows us to examine the ways 
that Keep Louisville Weird functions as an expression of citizenship, as it circulates alongside 
other artifacts that help to construct Louisvillians' civic identities, and creates space for 
rethinking how we define citizenship.  
 
WHY BUY LOCAL? 
 Like Timmons, I have a personal stake in a weird Louisville. I was born and lived there 
until 2007; I can recall seeing the very first signs of the campaign and watching it consume first 
the Highlands, and then Crescent Hill. But my interest is not limited to hometown pride. 
Louisville is by no means unique, but rather an example of a growing trend. The last decade has 
seen an increased interest in the local and the self-sustaining all over the country, as faltering 
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union strength, outsourcing, and an increase in part-time and contract work add to both 
unemployment statistics and the anxieties of the still-employed. Citing globalization as the 
source of job loss and falling wages, many have turned from the global to the local for solutions 
and resistance. While localization can take many forms, perhaps the most common is that which 
urges supporting and expanding local businesses in a community, usually by encouraging 
residents to support these businesses (exclusively, ideally) over chains or franchises.  
 Many of the arguments for buying locally  concern economics. One of the most common 
claims by localization enthusiasts is that local businesses profit a community more in the long 
run than chains and franchises by keeping more money circulating locally and giving more back 
to the community. Jeff Milchen, co-founder of the American Independent Business Alliance 
(AMIBA), cites the “multiplier effect” as one of the reasons citizens should support local 
businesses over chains. Milchen argues that “Dollars spent at community-based merchants create 
a multiplier effect in the local economy, meaning from each dollar spent at a local independent 
merchant, three or more times as much typically goes back into the local economy compared to a 
dollar spent at chain-owned businesses” (Milchen). Local businesses are more likely to hire local 
talent to build, repair, adorn, and staff their businesses, and to use local media for their 
advertisements, multiplying the number of transactions within a community. AMIBA references 
a 2003 survey of economic impact taken by its Austin, TX branch, which “concluded for every 
$100 spent at a chain, $13 remained in the community while $45
1
 remained when spent with 
home town businesses” (AMIBA). A more recent study, conducted in Louisville in 2012 
suggests that it’s closer to $55. (Civic Economics Indie Impact Study Series).This much-cited 
survey appears in both Stacy Mitchell’s Big-Box Swindle, and Michael Shuman’s The Small-
Mart Revolution, popular books encouraging localization, as well as on the websites of multiple 
                                                          
1
 
23 
 
organizations affiliated with AMIBA. In stressing that buying locally keeps money circulating in 
a community, advocates argue not just that local merchants spend locally, on wages, ads, 
suppliers, and construction, but more importantly, local businesses do not have corporate 
headquarters six states away to send their profits to.  
 These arguments do not stand unchallenged however, nor are they unproblematic. The 
vice president of communication for the International Franchise Association, Terry Hill, argues 
that “most franchises are run by local owners who also give back to their communities and spend 
money near home” (qtd. in C. Lynch). And although he claims that local businesses deliver 
benefits like these more reliably, Shuman at least admits that “nearly all kinds of businesses offer 
a community the benefit of jobs, tax dollars, charitable contributions, and local economic 
stimulus” (Shuman 9). Even AMIBA concedes that “some chains give back to towns in which 
they do business, and not all local businesses are exemplary models” (AMIBA). These claims 
suggest both that while buying local in general may benefit a community, particular instances of 
buying local do not necessarily do so, and that not every dollar spent at other businesses ends up 
elsewhere.  
 What seems less debatable is information indicating that local businesses in cities with 
active buy-local campaigns do better than those in cities without (“Independent”). A December 
2008 Courier-Journal article, which calls Louisville’s recent emphasis on the local “a miniature 
of the national picture,” notes that while a few stores in the Keep Louisville Weird alliance are 
worse off than before, most are holding ground steadily, and others thriving (Puckett). A month 
later, another piece reports that holiday sales for stores in buy local movements were stronger 
than those with no such affiliations. Although local businesses still saw a (to be expected) drop 
from pre-bailout 2007 holiday sales, the drop in 2008 was only by 3.2%, whereas independent 
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retailers without movement support dropped by 5.6% (“Independent”). More interestingly, 
perhaps, a survey by the Institute for Local Self-Reliance found that while independent retailers 
lost 5% in sales nationally, they did substantially better than chains like Barnes and Noble, Best 
Buy, The Gap, and Williams-Sonoma, which lost 7.7%, 6.5%, 14%, and 24.2% respectively 
(“Independent”). If these numbers can be relied on, they indicate not only that buy local 
movements benefit independent businesses, but that even in cases where no such movement is 
present, the last few years have seen a general turn away from chains toward indigenous 
business.  
 To return to my earlier point, then, while there’s some evidence of economic benefit in 
buying locally, it’s difficult to say exactly how much, or which local businesses reliably provide 
it. Rhetoric in support of local businesses combines claims about economic concerns with claims 
that extend beyond that realm. Appeals are often made to the “priceless” advantages of strong 
community, while chains are criticized for appealing to shoppers purely as consumers rather than 
citizens. Although chains often offer lower prices, and consumers have an understandable desire 
to make their budgets stretch further –especially today- those who support localization urge them 
not to exchange their homes and local cultures for short-term savings. Mitchell argues that 
neighborhoods with higher numbers of local businesses have assets such as a “richer civic life,” 
and a “wider variety of jobs.” And small businesses, buy-local enthusiasts say, don’t just bring 
money to a community, they also bring what Mitchell calls “social capital,” networks of 
economic and social support. These businesses “nurture informal interaction” and “foster 
empathy, camaraderie and a sense of responsibility for one another” (Mitchell 80). These 
arguments ask us to shift our perspective - reject saving more for yourself on a particular trip in 
favor of keeping more money circulating in the community; choose economic transactions, even 
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if they’re not maximized by local businesses, that are nonetheless being delivered more 
humanely by these businesses.  
 Groups like AMIBA, and authors like Mitchell and Shuman, argue that what they offer is 
a vision of ourselves that competes with the one thrust on us by Big-Box chains. These retailers 
have become as powerful as they are in part “by getting people to assume the narrow role of 
consumer,” obscuring the issue of their impact on our communities by making the conversation 
one limited to our consumption of goods (Mitchell 205). The more we are encouraged to view 
ourselves as consumers first and citizens second, they suggest, the less likely we are to make 
community a priority. Because local businesses are rooted in the community, and tied to its fate, 
unlike a chain, which can always go elsewhere, they are less likely to “sacrifice valuable 
community assets, such as a beautiful view or the quiet of a neighborhood” (Mitchell 88). They 
have to live here too, after all, and thus have goals other than making money. Choices made with 
only profits in mind lead to irresponsible uses of land and resources, with the result that “cheap 
goods and services” become “more important than endangered species, beautiful wilderness, 
local democracy, historic preservation, downtown aesthetics, even more important than religion” 
(Shuman 38). As well, advocates such as Shuman have argued that becoming more self-
sufficient insulates a community from economic downturns and corruption or incompetence in 
central government, and in a more extreme moment he points out that a community which is 
autonomous with regard to food, electricity, and water is less vulnerable to terrorist attacks (53). 
The development that accompanies the cheap goods and services at chains sometimes come at 
the cost of our homes, and if we would preserve them, we must turn toward the local. 
 Preserving our homes is defined here not just as literally keeping them safe (from harmful 
development, or terrorist attacks), but also as keeping them recognizable, by preserving our 
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“unique culture, foods, ecology, architecture, history, music, and art,” keeping them from being 
“steamroll[ed] with retail monocultures” (Shuman 57). Most of us are familiar with the 
experience Jenny Rice describes in the opening pages of Distant Publics, that of traveling on 
highways where signs encourage us to visit the same chains - Target, Home Depot, McDonald's, 
Subway - that we can find at home. And although stores like these are touted as job-producers, 
buy local advocates point out that gaining a Barnes & Noble or a Best Buy often means that 
small, locally-owned stores can't compete and eventually fold. The gain must then be set not only 
against the loss of those jobs, but also against the loss of diversity. Funky bookstores promoting 
local authors and history are replaced by the same bestsellers on display at every Barnes & 
Noble. Niche electronic, computer, and record stores bow to the sprawling convenience of Best 
Buy. Even if the loss and gain of jobs and income balances out, we find that our town begins to 
lose its distinctiveness and resemble any other town. The question then, for buy-local supporters, 
is whether we can possibly save enough on goods and services at chains to compensate us for the 
loss of priceless things like our communities and culture.  
KEEP LOUISVILLE WEIRD 
 Concerns like these are what prompted the owner of ear X-tacy to start the Keep 
Louisville Weird movement. Timmons admits that he originally opened the record store while he 
“figure[d] out what I was going to do for a career,” but the store took root, and its logo 
“[became] one of the most recognizable icons” in the city (Bickers). In the first 20 years after it’s 
opening in 1985, ear X-tacy became a Louisville institution, operating as a hangout for music 
lovers, and a symbol of hope for other local business owners. Aside from providing a place to 
buy music, ear X-tacy made a point of supporting Kentuckiana
2
 musicians by maintaining a 
sizable collection of local artists, promoting shows, and even running a record label affiliated 
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 Kentucky/Indiana 
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with the store. Customers could come in and pick up fliers for events around town, and hear new 
music –local or otherwise- recommended by a staff that prided itself on its breadth of musical 
knowledge. The record store did well enough in its first years to move to 1534 Bardstown Road, 
a prime location in Louisville’s trendy Highlands neighborhood, and an address formerly 
occupied by a Pier One
3
 (Bickers). It would be tempting, looking back, to see the 1995 move as 
the first step in what became a hard-fought campaign to maintain Louisville’s local businesses 
against the spread of chains. 
 Battle lines were officially drawn in 2003, when the first billboard appeared. This was a 
particularly alarming year for the area’s local businesses. In the previous decade, Meijer had 
opened stores in Louisville, which further reduced the flagging Winn-Dixie groceries and 
threatened even strong chains like Kroger, to say nothing of the threat it posed to local 
businesses. 2003, however, saw the arrival of Wild Oats and Whole Foods, which impacted even 
those local grocers like Rainbow Blossom, who had held on to their customer base for three 
decades through the promotion of specializations not covered by the grocery chains, like natural 
foods, and preventative and alternative medicines. More ominous, perhaps, was the decision 
made by Hawley-Cooke bookstore to admit defeat and sell their stores to Borders
4
 (“Keeping 
Louisville Weird”). The death of the beloved bookstore alarmed other local entrepreneurs, 
including Timmons. Realizing that many Louisvillians hadn’t even known the bookstore was 
struggling, he decided to raise awareness about the plight of local businesses. Inspired by a trip 
to Austin and its Keep Austin Weird campaign, Timmons began with a billboard that simply read 
“Keep Louisville Weird,” but soon the words began to appear on the sides of buses, t-shirts, and 
                                                          
3
 Since ear X-tacy’s close, Panera Bread has taken up residence, in spite of strong support by media and 
residents for the owner to lease the site to another local business.  
4
 Borders, of course, has since closed all the stores they purchased from the much-missed Hawley-Cooke, 
leaving Louisville with only a few Barnes and Noble and Half-Price Books locations to supplement the independent 
retailers still hanging on. 
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bumper stickers (“Keeping”). Within a few years, as more people discovered where the slogan 
came from and what it stood for, it became the rallying cry not just of Timmons but of other 
local businesses, many of which came together to form the Louisville Independent Business 
Alliance (LIBA).  
 Unfortunately, ear X-tacy itself is no longer among their ranks. In spite of a small but 
fiercely loyal fan-base, the store suffered financially and moved south from its prime Highlands 
location to the Douglass Loop in 2010, and struggled on for another year before closing in 
October of 2011. Even if it has had to do so without its founding member, though, LIBA seems 
to be going strong. Today the Alliance boasts over 500 members, and their most recent (2013) 
“Summer/Fall Guide,” a phonebook of local businesses that includes ads and coupons, is a 39-
page directory with entries ranging across entertainment, retail, services, food, and even a listing 
of non-local businesses they consider “supporters" dedicated to helping them keep Louisville 
weird. 
FROM SITUATION TO ECOLOGY 
 It hasn't always been clear, though, looking at the movement, what it means to be 
"weird," and how we go about preserving that "weirdness." Many conclude, as the LIBA seems 
to, that weirdness means a variety of local stores, and we preserve it by shopping at them. To 
assume this, I argue, means positioning the movement in a very narrow definition of the 
rhetorical situation, unconsciously echoing the formulaic rules of rhetoric laid out by Lloyd 
Bitzer. In his 1968 article, Bitzer defines rhetoric as “pragmatic,” saying rhetoric comes into 
being “for the sake of something beyond itself; it functions ultimately to produce action or 
change in the world; it performs some task” (302). So far, so good. The catch is that rhetoric 
must perform a specific task, one tied intimately to the exigence which prompts the rhetoric to 
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begin with. (Like being Weird, rhetoric has only one job here.) For Bitzer, an exigence(the flaw 
or sense of urgency) is only rhetorical if it can be altered by discourse –in those cases where the 
rhetor is unable to determine beforehand whether or not discourse will be effective, he must 
proceed as if the exigence is rhetorical and hope for the best.  The example Bitzer gives to 
illustrate the dilemma faced by the uncertain rhetor is that of a lawyer trying to decide whether to 
make an appeal on behalf of a client (305). Although this is clearly an exigence for counsel and 
client, the lawyer may not be able to tell if it is a rhetorical one, and thus whether making an 
appeal will have any effect. Because it is theoretically possible for the situation to be altered by 
discourse however, the Bitzerian lawyer would make the appeal, discovering by his failure or 
success whether or not the exigence was rhetorical. 
 For the student (or user) of rhetoric, there are causes for concern here. First, Bitzer's 
theory relies on both an identifiable exigence, even if only after the fact, and requires the rhetor 
to seek a particular outcome which functions both to prove the success of the rhetor and prove 
the exigence rhetorical after the fact. When the desired outcome is not achieved, it means one of 
two things: the rhetor has “missed the mark,” and failed to provide the fitting response to a 
rhetorical exigence, or the rhetor has misinterpreted the exigence, seeing it as rhetorical when in 
fact it was not (307). But more importantly, this model of the rhetorical situation denies the 
possibility that rhetoric that “fails” to secure the favorable outcome may still *be* rhetoric, and 
may still have effects, even if they are far-reaching and unpredictable.  
 Bitzer’s approach to rhetoric has been well-explored by others5, and my goal here is 
neither to defend nor revise him, but I am interested in the way his formulaic interpretation of the 
rhetorical situation manifests in discussion of the Keep Louisville Weird campaign. In an 
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 Scholarship by Richard Vatz, Craig Smith and Scott Lybarger, and Barbara Biesecker directly respond to 
and build on Bitzer's work, for example.  
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announcement/analysis of a 2008 book-signing event entitled “Why Buy Local,” Rick Redding, 
a contributor to the online newspaper The ‘Ville Voice, both encouraged and criticized the Keep 
Louisville Weird movement. The campaign, he noted, has “a really cool tag line,” but ultimately 
“include[s] a lot more talk than action” (Redding). This argument implies that Keep Louisville 
Weird, while an interesting piece of rhetoric on its own, does not meet the exigence its rhetor 
(presumably Timmons or the LIBA) is responding to. Keep Louisville Weird is (or should be) a 
man on a mission, loosed in the world with the sole purpose of encouraging local sales. With this 
in mind, Redding’s article proposes suggestions for maximizing the effectiveness of the 
movement, something the author feels Keep Louisville Weird currently fails to do. 
 This critique relies on the Bitzerian model of the rhetorical situation, which assumes that 
if Keep Louisville Weird “fails” to perform the specific task assigned to it, it achieves nothing. 
Comments about the online article both agreed with and disputed the author’s position, 
producing statistics about sales and advertisements. These comments agree with Redding's 
assessment of the purpose of the movement's rhetoric, even if they dispute his claims about the 
effects. In essence, these comments are engaged in a conversation about whether or not the 
movement has responded adequately to a rhetorical exigence. 
 Most interesting to me, however, are two other comments, one of which asks “Why is 
keeping Louisville weird a 100% commerce based activity?” Another left later that same day 
adds, “Keeping Louisville weird is far more than a commercial activity… it’s a cultural activity” 
(Redding). These comments examine Keep Louisville Weird not as if it were an object with 
clearly defined borders, sent into the world to perform a specific task, but as something harder to 
pin down. This view of rhetoric is much closer to Rice's interpretation of the rhetorical situation 
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as “a framework of affective ecologies,” wherein all elements are interconnected in affective 
relationships, and can have far-reaching and unpredictable effects (9).  
 Under a Bitzerian model, rhetoric which doesn’t fit the situation simply misses the mark, 
it goes nowhere. In an ecological model, the stakes are much higher. To open up the rhetorical 
situation in this way means that the question is not what supporters of Keep Louisville Weird –
whether that means Timmons, local businesses, or individual shoppers- intend it to do, but rather 
what it actually does. Rice's work on Keep Austin Weird examines the way this slogan, set loose 
in the world, not only impacts the sales and situation of local businesses, but performs other 
work as well. Rice reports that “The phrase “Keep Austin Weird” quickly passed into the city’s 
cultural circulation, taking on the importance of a quasi-civic duty” (16).The phrase comes to 
stand for a call to maintain a desirable state against undesirable changes, to exercise the 
responsibility Austin residents felt to their hometown. In entering the city’s “cultural 
circulation,” the phrase gets adapted to other institutions/situations Austin residents hope to 
preserve. The impact of Keep Austin Weird is felt not just at more and more local businesses, but 
at The University of Texas, a local library, and a Cingular advertisement.  
 Keep Austin Weird is also felt in Louisville, as one of the cities to adopt its battle cry. 
The work being done by Keep Austin Weird (and thus by Keep Louisville Weird) goes far 
beyond the simple success or failure of an isolated piece of rhetoric, intended to have only one 
effect in only one situation. The criticisms in “Why Buy Local” may not acknowledge this work, 
but the comments defending Keep Louisville Weird not only refuse to treat it as “already-
formed” and “already-discrete,” they demonstrate some of the unpredictable effects of rhetoric in 
the way they talk about the movement itself. Neither comment speaks of Keep Louisville Weird 
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as a slogan or a proper name; instead both write about keeping Louisville weird, an action 
performed by members of a shared culture. 
 Opening up the situation in this way not only allows the movement to have wider effects, 
but it causes a shift in how we view the participants themselves. Redding's interpretation limits 
Keep Louisville Weird's audience by defining them as consumers who hear the message and 
either do or do not shop at local businesses in response. To examine Keep Louisville Weird as 
part of an ecology allows us to consider movement affiliation, as the discussions above indicate, 
as a cultural or civic activity, and to see how it functions to help residents both identify 
themselves as Louisvillian and to respond with others to the public problems that attend 
development and consumption.  
A STICKY SITUATION ECOLOGY 
 In this section I want to flesh out the connection between buying local and civic duty that 
occurs in Louisville as a result of the movement. This connection between weirdness and 
citizenship happened largely through association, as Keep Louisville Weird found itself thrown 
up against and amidst other signs of Louisville culture circulating in the rhetorical ecology. As 
this happens, the signs stick to one another, creating new associations and connections.  
 In particular, Keep Louisville Weird was associated, almost from its origin, with a 
genuinely “weird” trend from the decades preceding the movement. This trend involves ear X-
tacy bumper stickers, which Louisvillian cars first began to sport in 1986. The stickers were the 
result, Timmons says, of an order he placed to get rid of a stubborn salesperson, and featured 
only the store’s logo, the words “ear X-tacy” in white on a black background, in a typewriter font 
(Bickers). As the store's popularity grew, more stickers showed up, both inside the city and 
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elsewhere. Timmons reports proudly that his stickers have been spotted as far away as Havana, 
Cuba (Bickers).  
 Ear X-tacy stickers also became part of what I called a genuinely weird trend. Soon after 
theybegan appearing on cars, there were variations. Someone at the store noticed the words 
“aXeyr cat” on a car bumper, in the familiar clunky font (Nold 117). The original sticker had 
been carefully cut into strips, which were rearranged to form a new sticker with a new message. 
But whether this was the first and the rest sprouted in its wake, or if this was only the first to be 
recognized, no one seems to know for sure. No matter which, once noticed, the variations 
seemed to be everywhere. Some of them appeared to be in conversation with the cryptic 
command cited above: “reX ate yr cat” (instead of or after it was aXed is uncertain), and “attack 
yreX” (once you’ve taken care of the cat) (Nold 117). Other permutations included “racer-X,” 
“create art” (Bickers), “taX year,” “da red taXi,” “triX or treat,” and “redundancy” (Nold 117). 
Slogans like these graced not only car bumpers, but also guitar cases, binders, and other flat 
surfaces. The stickers achieved widespread recognition when they made it into the 1997 Insiders' 
Guide to Louisville, Kentucky and Southern Indiana, which records two of my favorite remixes: 
the words “eXtra starch” on the back of a laundry truck, and the name of a competing Louisville 
record store, “better days” (Nold 117). 
 The intended purpose of the messages varied –from the obvious and ironic rivalry of 
“better days” to the (presumably) playful violence of “aXeyr cat,” and the performative 
challenge both issued and executed by “create art”- but what all the variations have in common is 
the fact that they invoke both ear X-tacy or Louisville yet never directly reference either one. 
Like the use of "weird" in the Cingular advertisement Rice describes, the stickers drag with them 
a host of associations as they circulate. 
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  In her book, The Cultural Politics of Emotion, Sara Ahmed describes this association as 
“stickiness,” a concept particularly appropriate when discussing bumper stickers. As Ahmed 
explains, signs can become sticky through repetition, or by encountering other sticky signs, 
either of which increases the overall affective value of the sign. Ahmed compares an object or 
sign which “gets repeated and accumulates affective value” to a “sticky finger” (90). That this 
term brings to mind thoughts of “sticky-fingered” thieves or children is appropriate; these images 
are useful for visualizing what Ahmed means. Sticky things get stuck to other things, or at least 
leave a sticky residue behind. Ahmed gives the example of disgust, specifically disgust and the 
circulation of hate-speech; when the language of disgust is applied to people or ideas, it 
eventually sticks –bringing with it the anger or fear that tends to get stuck to hateful language. 
Terms which refer to marginalized groups become insults by their “association with other signs, 
other forms of derision,” but once this association is repeated often enough, the terms themselves 
become sticky, and the association between the terms and the derisive language –itself sticky- no 
longer needs to be made (92). Common metaphors like “dragging his name through the mud” 
suggest this transformation; after enough time, the mud sticks. When a sticky sign is used, it both 
carries with it the fingerprints of the sticky things that have touched it and gets its prints on 
everything new it brushes up against.  
 Stickiness is about the history of an object, and “what objects do to other objects,” how 
they brush up against and collide with one another as they circulate, acquiring this affective 
value (91). Much as a coin becomes more tarnished (and sometimes literally sticky) only if it’s in 
circulation, signs only become sticky if they are repeated, and repeated in the same or similar 
ways. Signs are not themselves intrinsically associated with positive or negative emotions, but 
“[If] a word is used in a certain way,” Ahmed says “again and again, then that ‘use’ becomes 
35 
 
intrinsic” (91). This effect can be limiting, when negative emotions stick and the object or sign is 
unable to shed them and acquire new value (witness the lingering effects of hate-speech, for 
example), but it can also be useful for binding diverse signs (and their affective values) together. 
In this case, Louisville sticks to “ear X-tacy” for the person who spotted the sticker in Cuba in 
the same way that ear X-tacy (and Louisville) are stuck to “aXeyr cat” and its fellows for anyone 
who recognizes the font used in these playful variations. The remixed stickers become an inside 
joke, a statement about belonging to a place that allows others from the same place to recognize 
us. 
 When the Keep Louisville Weird movement first entered the ecology, it was impossible 
for ear X-tacy not to adhere to it, given the form it took. The original artifacts of the movement 
weren’t signed by Timmons, but most of the people who saw them realized immediately that 
they had some connection to ear X-tacy, myself included. Although adapted from the Keep 
Austin Weird campaign discussed in Rice's article, there are several differences between the 
visual presentation of the two. The original Austin stickers appear to have featured the logos of 
two local businesses on either side of the words Keep Austin Weird, with “support local 
businesses” in smaller letters underneath (Rice 16). Variations built on this, featuring the logos 
of other businesses in combination with the Keep Austin Weird font and style. In contrast, when 
Timmons began the Louisville campaign, and Keep Louisville Weird began to appear on 
bumpers, it was only those three words, minus the accompanying text –defining “weird” as 
“local”- and without store slogans. In fact, because Timmons used the same color scheme and 
font that appear on his store logo, ear X-tacy was the only local business referenced by the 
movement. Keep Louisvile Weird thus initially as no different than"aXeyr cat" –more coherent, 
perhaps, slightly less ambiguous, but dragging all the baggage of ear X-tacy in its wake. And as 
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the phrase Keep Louisville Weird repeated, and showed up in more and more places, it didn’t 
loosen its hold on ear X-tacy, but stuck to, and got stuck in with, other signs of Louisvillian 
identity. 
WEIRD CITIZENS 
 The rhetoric of Keep Louisville Weird constructs the Louisvillian citizen as an identity in 
danger of being lost; a Louisville which exists as weird and is in the process of becoming less 
weird is at risk of becoming not only not-weird, but not-Louisville. The movement asks its 
audience members to construct themselves as having a stake in maintaining the distinction 
between weird and not-weird, or Louisville and not-Louisville. The slogan thus announces not 
just consumer loyalty, but becomes, as the commenter on The ‘Ville Voice argues, a “cultural 
activity.” 
 Unsurprisingly, since the relative success of Keep Louisville Weird and a national turn 
toward the local, Louisville has seen many more expressions of hometown pride, which often 
manifests (also unsurprisingly) as support for local businesses. Local news stations and the most 
widely read paper, The Courier-Journal, cover events such as the “Indie Day,” hosted by ear X-
tacy in 2007, a festival which combined the promotion of independent musicians in general with 
local food, beverages, and wares. The yearly St. James Art Fair has become more oriented 
around the same businesses whose names appear again and again in connection with Keep 
Louisville Weird. As mentioned above, LIBA publishes and distributes a sizable guide to 
shopping locally, with over a hundred businesses represented, offering a variety of goods and 
services. During the most recent holiday seasons, the Association members hosted fairs and 
introduced a “passport” that shoppers could get stamped at participating stores. Those with 
enough stamps were eligible to win prizes donated by "weird" businesses.  
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 More interesting, however, are unexpected examples of how keeping Louisville weird 
has become, in Rice's words, a "quasi-civic duty," as it gets bound up with language and symbols 
connected to citizenship. Urging the city to support a particular renovation plan that would 
revitalize the Whiskey Row area without removing Louisvlle’s cast-iron building fronts, The 
Courier-Journal reminds readers that, nationally, only New York City boasts more of these 
fixtures and argues that “without doubt, these historic fronts need to be preserved to maintain the 
city’s unique character –or to “keep Lousiville Weird,” as local businesses put it” (“Making 
history”). In his race against Anne Northup, Councilman John Yarmuth, better known locally 
before he took his seat as the founder of LEO Magazine (Louisville’s Eccentric Observer) 
reminded Louisvillians not only of his own status as a local businessman, but of his long-time 
support for other local businesses and community projects. ear X-tacy owner Timmons let 
Yarmuth hold a “Keep Louisville Yarmuth” rally at his record store, and many of the same cars 
sporting Weird stickers added Yarmuth's remix alongside.  
 Symbols promoting Louisvillian citizenship are also more common. The fleur-de-lis 
motif which appears on all official Louisville seals is hardly a new design; the city gets its name 
from King Louis XVI. Variations on this stylized flower have long appeared singly or in groups 
on public works vehicles, street signs, police cars, and many trash bins. To say that parts of the 
city have always "worn" Louisville on its body would not be much of a stretch. More recently, 
an increasing number of local businesses incorporate the fleur-de-lis into their signs, often 
businesses affiliated with Keep Louisville Weird and the LIBA (which itself sports a fleur-de-lis 
in its logo), becoming not just independently owned businesses but Louisvillian independently 
owned businesses. The citizens who support them, in affixing sticky signs like Keep Louisville 
Weird bumper stickers to their cars, or by purchasing t-shirts from ear X-tacy, Heine Brothers 
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Coffee, or the Bluegrass Brewing Company wear citizenship on their cars or bodies. Still others 
brand the city into their skin; fleur-de-lis tattoos, thin on the ground before the movement, are 
now a very common choice for those who want to display their identification with Louisville.  
 The variety of citizenship being offered here functions in multiple registers, and has 
potential impact both inside of and outside of the institutions of citizenship. It influences daily 
individual choices about where to buy coffee, which bank to use, or what tattoo to get, but in 
operating on a cultural level it also raises questions about topics such as what our cities should 
look like, what the responsibilities of consumers and retailers are to one another, and what the 
responsibilities of both are to the communities they are embedded in. These topics, while 
certainly political, are not normally susceptible to the influence of citizens, who often receive 
little official voice in choosing the businesses around them. In arguing that we vote with our 
dollars, buy-local movements allow for greater participation from citizens, and in brushing up 
against one another, Keep Louisville Weird and Yarmuth's campaign encourages them to bring 
extra-institutional practices to bear on elections, to participate in both.  
CONCLUSIONS  
 I have argued that examining the movement as part of an ecology allows its impact on 
citizenship in Louisville to come forward, by challenging us to think outside of restrictive 
notions of the rhetorical situation at the often unforeseen and unintended effects of rhetoric. It's 
unlikely that John Timmons (to the extent that we can pinpoint an actor here) imagined that he 
would (literally) change what being from Louisville looks like. As I conclude, though, I want to 
consider some of the other possible (and less positive) material effects of buy local rhetoric: 
local-washing and gentrification. Rice finds it ironic that a big-name like Cingular takes up 
“weird” in Austin, incorporating it into their advertisements, but today this sort of "local-
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washing" has become so common that we no longer blink at it. Given the popularity of buying 
local, the word "local" (like "weird" in Louisville) carries with it positive affective value, and 
entities we might not normally think of as local have rushed to make use of that value. 
Bookstores include small sections on local interests and grocery chains make a point of 
displaying a token selection of local items. Companies like Starbucks or Meijer remind shoppers 
in Washington and Michigan that these states are their "home" even if they've spread across the 
nation (or globe).  
 The practice of local-washing (strangely enough, given the term) reveals the difficulty of 
determining what it means to be local. Is Starbucks local if you're in Seattle, if nowhere else? Is 
Heine Bros (a coffeeshop indigenous to Louisville that's grown to about a dozen stores in the last 
15 years) still small enough to be local? When are you too big to be weird? Keeping Louisville 
weird obscures the question of what the term means –because Louisville is constructed by its 
very phrasing as already in this state. All that can be inferred is that Louisville as it exists now is 
weird, and this weird is desirable. One irony of the movement is that the visual origin of the 
slogan, as I discussed earlier, grows out of –and eventually replaces- a Louisvillian trend which 
was distinctly weird. Because Keep Louisville Weird gets stuck to ear X-tacy, we can safely 
assume that the record store is weird, and by extension, those businesses affiliated with the LIBA 
alongside it. Beyond that, weird gets harder to pin down. Those businesses are local, but there 
are many local businesses whose owners choose not to be affiliated with either the LIBA or Keep 
Louisville Weird.  
 The obscurity of "weird" gives rise to my concerns about gentrification. In recent years, 
the LIBA has begun a campaign to bring the movement to South Louisville, to neighborhoods 
not heavily marked by the visible signs of citizen performance so prolific in the Highlands and 
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Crescent Hill, predominantly white, middle-class neighborhoods. A survey of over 500 south 
Louisville residents reported that they are interested in seeing more local businesses, in particular 
more restaurants, bookstores, and entertainment venues. While local businesses are thinner on 
the ground in neighborhoods like Shively, where cheap fast food and retail options abound, such 
businesses do exist. Nonetheless, the LIBA reports that "The top specific requests were Heine 
Brothers’ Coffee, Bluegrass Brewing Company, Rainbow Blossom, Homemade Ice Cream & Pie 
Kitchen and Carmichael’s" (Boyd). All are prominent LIBA members, of course. Their 
infiltration into south Louisville could threaten existing local businesses, whose names are not so 
well known and who do not benefit from the positive feelings associated with Keep Louisville 
Weird affiliates. Here "keeping" south Louisville weird runs the risk of making it the same weird 
that exists on Bardstown Road, rather than seeking out and maintaining the cultures of these 
neighborhoods. In these examples, the language of these movements is taken up by those 
(perhaps including the LIBA) who would move buying local away from the cultural or civic and 
closer to the register of consumerism.  
 My point, though, is not to denounce the practices of businesses which have an 
understandable interest in remaining competitive, but to point out that seeing the civic dimension 
of buying local (and consequently, the possible civic dimension of choosing not to buy locally) 
allows us to grapple with public issues that are lost when where we shop is simply a matter of 
individual preference.  
41 
 
Chapter 3 Co-operative Competition and the "Battle in Seattle" 
 In the last chapter, I focused on what could be called the smallest of my examples of 
extra-institutional citizenship. It is small geographically, inasmuch as the rhetoric of Keep 
Louisville Weird suggests to those it touches that both problems and their solution are already 
present, and the movement is largely unconcerned with the fate of other towns. While it might 
prompt us to develop an approach to consumption that can be applied to any city we might visit 
or move to, it is most concerned with the condition of a single city. But it is also small in terms 
of conflict, because our disinclination to regard acts of consumption as civic engagement means 
that participants are under no obligation to interact with those who disagree with them. They are 
more likely to be dismissed than attacked.  
 This chapter zooms out, both in scope and in potential for conflict, to look at an example 
of protest - specifically the 1999 demonstrations against the World Trade Organization in Seattle, 
WA. I vividly remember the "Battle in Seattle". The year before, I’d spent my spring break in the 
city, falling in love with the damp air, vibrant neighborhoods, and hazy skies. I knew ahead of 
time, from the news and from acquaintances in the city that a massive, peaceful protest was in 
the works, and I listened horrified as the stories trickled in of fires in the street, residents 
harassed by police and spreading clouds of tear gas, and unresisting protestors brutally attacked 
with batons, pepper spray, and rubber bullets. I’d seen small protests before, but Seattle was eye-
opening, both because of its size and because of the city’s reaction.  
 Although I knew vaguely that the demonstrations, and thus the violence, had something 
to do with the World Trade Organization, I understood very little about what it was or why 
anyone would be for or against it. At the time then, I was firmly on the side of the demonstrators 
without fully understanding why.  Today, although I still share many of the concerns, 
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complaints, and goals of the men and women who took to the streets, the question of Seattle no 
longer seems one of sides. Fifteen years ago, I was indignant at hearing demonstrators referred to 
by the media and my own relatives as thugs, idiots, whining children, criminals (the same 
charges I would later be indignant about as a participant in the Detroit branch of Occupy Wall 
Street), but my anger stemmed from my convictions about the rightness of all the protests stood 
for. Today, my response to a narrative that paints WTO demonstrators as dupes or criminals is to 
wonder why we are so quick to dismiss conflict as either ignorance or lawlessness, why we are 
so unwilling to hear dissenting voices. Why, amid concerns about low voter turnout and 
politically apathetic young people, are we made uncomfortable by what seem like expressions of 
passionate civic engagement?  
 As my comparison to Occupy suggests, the events of Seattle are still relevant today. 
Protests like these are immediately identifiable as political, which would seem to make it easy to 
regard protesters as citizens. In reality, however, I will argue in this chapter that what it means to 
be an engaged citizen is still unclear, and those who take to the streets to exercise their civic 
responsibilities are still likely to find themselves in the midst of a question about sides, calling 
themselves heroes while the opposition labels them criminals.  
 After a brief overview of the history of the WTO, and the grievances that led to the 
protests, I will discuss the competing narratives about “what happened” in Seattle. While 
protesters insist that they dealt a crippling blow to the WTO, critics insist that the demonstrations 
were nothing more than an embarrassing (and expensive) inconvenience. Following this, I will 
zoom in on one of the most widely recognized representations of the demonstrations, Stuart 
Townsend’s Battle in Seattle. Although the film champions the protestors, it does so by taking up 
the rhetoric of warfare, painting the conflict as a battle and the protestors as victorious soldiers. 
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In both personal accounts and the film, opposing parties, and their competing narratives, remain 
antagonistic, with the result that it becomes difficult to talk about the demonstrations as acts of 
citizenship.  
 The position I will take is not that such conflict needs to be eliminated - rather it is that 
we need to more productively allow for conflict in performances of citizenship. In “Rhetoric – 
Old and New,” Kenneth Burke references the “co-operative competition” between multiple 
rhetoricians that “can lead to views transcending the limitations of each” (203). I draw on Burke  
because cooperative competition suggests a means of managing conflict that doesn't rely on the 
suppression of lesser voices by a dominant voice, or on belief in an (often imaginary) middle 
ground of compromise where everyone is appeased. As I will demonstrate in this chapter, 
though, while there is ample conflict between protestors and their critics, and within the ranks of 
the demonstrators themselves, very little of it is cooperative or leads to transformation. Instead, 
the conflict becomes absorbed in the language of war and citizenship is pushed to the side.  
OVERVIEW 
 The origins of the World Trade Organization date back to the Second World War. After 
World War II, the United States and other developed countries gathered at the Bretton Woods 
Conference to establish agreements on economic issues. Regarding tariffs and other trade 
barriers as contributing factors in the Depression and the acts of aggression following it, these 
nations sought to eliminate them in an effort to raise the economic well-being of all countries 
(Fergusson). Economic prosperity, they felt, would lead to peace. With this in mind, the 
Conference laid the groundwork for institutions such as the International Monetary Fund, the 
World Bank, and the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. The GATT, formed in 1948, was 
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a provisional agreement which stood until the formation of the WTO, implemented January 1, 
1995.  
 The WTO’s sphere of influence has grown over the years, and is both wide and clearly 
marked. The GATT at first dealt only in measures such as tariffs, bans, and quotas, with other 
rules, such as those regarding subsidies, coming later. During the Uruguay Round (1986-1994), 
questions of intellectual property were added to the GATT’s sphere and inherited by the WTO, 
with the result that today “Trade agreements administered by the WTO cover a broad range of 
goods and services trade and apply to virtually all government practices that directly relate to 
trade, for example tariffs, subsidies, government procurement, and trade-related intellectual 
property rights” (Fergusson). Many, demonstrators in Seattle among them, want(ed) the WTO to 
add questions of labor and the environment to their agendas. Calling these “nontraditional 
topics,” Ian Fergusson says in a 2011 report for Congress that “U.S. businesses generally want 
the WTO to refrain from extending beyond … traditionally trade-related issues, because they 
argue that the greatest export opportunities will be achieved only if negotiators focus on trade 
barriers and do not include social factors.” This position seems unproductive to some, who argue 
that our economic conditions influence our social lives, and thus social factors should have the 
opportunity to “talk back” to economic concerns. As it stands though, while the WTO (today, 
perhaps in response to events in Seattle) cites protecting the environment as a concern, other 
social issues are outside their sphere.  
 The WTO’s purpose, like the GATT’s, is to supervise international trade, providing a 
forum where nations can meet and formalize agreements, as well as a court for member nations 
to bring grievances before. Members are expected to adhere to WTO agreements, and to abide by 
their rulings in any disputes that may arise, with the result that member nations retain their 
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autonomy but only at a price. Regarding the US’s position as a sovereign nation, Fergusson's 
report notes that members make a commitment to the WTO, agreeing to be bound by its rules 
and rulings. While the WTO “cannot force members to adhere to their obligations” (Fergusson), 
members  are aware that refusing these obligations may hinder their own efforts in future WTO 
negotiations. A nation can refuse to comply only at the risk of damaging its own future interests.  
 Although the WTO has a General Council which meets monthly, high-level decisions can 
only be made at a Ministerial Conference, one of which must be called every two years, if not 
more often. After its formation in 1995, the WTO held its first Ministerial Conference in 
December of 1996, in Singapore. The second, in May of 1998, was in Geneva. The third, known 
as the Millennium Round, destined to become better known as the site of the Battle in Seattle, 
was scheduled to begin in late November of 1999.  
 Resistance had been in the air for years before Seattle. Protests attended other meetings 
of the WTO, expressing concerns and outrage about the globalized world it represented. The 
Jubilee 2000 movement of the early 90s put pressure on politicians to pay attention to the plight 
of the world’s most impoverished nations, conditions they felt were aggravated by WTO or IMF 
policies. Consumer groups, unions, other labor-rights groups, and environmentalists pushed back 
against financial deregulation, and similar groups began to call attention to companies entangled 
with sweatshop labor. Libertarians and other isolationist conservatives, alarmed at the number of 
jobs moving overseas, objected to the economic damage done by globalization, while liberal 
groups were concerned with labor conditions and environmental damage.  
  By 1999, then, the battle lines were already drawn by those firmly in favor of or firmly 
opposed to the WTO and similar bodies, leaving the vast majority in the middle increasingly 
unable to ignore the debate, and trying to decide which side they should take. Politicians like 
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President Clinton, hoping to win over or hold onto moderate voters while keeping the unruly 
alliance of libertarians and liberals in check or on his side, respectively, attempted to walk a 
tightrope between challenging and conforming to the WTO. In a characteristic example of the 
difficulties attendant upon navigating these waters, Clinton asked the WTO to be more open and 
to put labor rights on the agenda for Seattle,  a move that attempted to make everyone happy and 
ultimately succeeded in making no one happy.  
 Recent rulings by the WTO, moreover, had already-skeptical citizens in many countries 
up in arms before the Seattle Ministerial was even scheduled. The WTO had recently ruled 
against Europe’s ban on hormone-treated meat (largely supplied by the US), and against the US's 
refusal to do business with companies whose practices endangered species such as dolphins and 
sea turtles. These actions further inflamed and frightened WTO skeptics and opponents, either by 
showing a disregard for the environment and public health, or by seeming to deny the 
sovereignty of the nations concerned.  
 The WTO, for its part, did little to dispel such fears; even today they use language that 
makes it clear where their priorities lie. Their website claims that while their agreements are 
lengthy and complex, a few simple principles form the foundation of the group: non-
discrimination, openness, predictability and transparency, improving competitiveness, 
benefitting less developed countries, and protecting the environment. On the surface, these sound 
admirable, but for the WTO openness means openness for trade, by way of eliminating barriers 
such as tariffs and import bans. Predictability and transparency likewise, are with respect to trade 
because they believe that “companies, investors and governments should be confident that trade 
barriers [will] not be raised arbitrarily” (“What we stand for”).  Even the WTO’s commitment to 
the environment is not their own, but rather a promise not to interfere with steps taken by 
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member nations to protect the environment or public health. Member nations are cautioned, 
moreover, not to use environmental protection “as a means of disguising protectionist policies.” 
As they say themselves, branded at the bottom of every page on their site, the primary function 
of the WTO is “to ensure that trade flows as smoothly, predictably and freely as 
possible.”Although a reference is made to the lower prices and greater choice to be enjoyed by 
consumers, by and large the WTO exists to protect and smooth the way for companies, investors, 
and governments.  
 It’s worth keeping in mind here that, as I said above, this is the language of today’s 
WTO, one that has supposedly responded to Seattle (and other demonstrations) with more 
openness and greater sensitivity. The lukewarm focus on the environment, for example, is the 
legacy of events in Seattle. What this suggests, then, is that the WTO, seeks to function as a 
governing body, but not one that promotes or allows for citizenship at any level smaller than a 
unified nation or less influential than a corporation. That businesses would have pull when it 
comes to determining positions makes sense, given the WTO’s goal of regulating trade. 
However, The Nation ran a piece in 1999 pointing out that “a coalition of corporations including 
Monsanto, DuPont, Merck and other giants” assisted the US in drafting their position on patents 
and copyrights during the GATT’s Uruguay Round” (Borosage), suggesting that these 
corporations are all but members. While individual citizens have no voice at WTO meetings, 
CEOs often do.  
 It was this sense of being excluded from decisions that impacted their lives, of having 
their citizenship curtailed, that led demonstrators to gather in Seattle and move against what The 
Art of Protest calls “a drastically unbalanced world economy in which the two hundred richest 
corporations have twice the wealth of the pooled assets of 80 percent of the world’s population, 
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and in which fifty of the one hundred wealthiest economies are not nations but corporations” 
(Reed 240). Estimates vary, but between 40 and 60,000 people seem to have been involved in the 
planning, execution, and aftermath of what became known as “The Battle in Seattle,” “The 
Battle of Seattle,” or simply “Seattle.” More than 700 organizations were represented, including 
the Global Trade Watch, steelworkers, longshoremen, loggers, the Sierra Club, Earth First!, the 
AFL-CIO, the Ruckus Society, the Rainforest Action Network, and others. Big names such as 
Noam Chomsky, Naomi Klein, and Ralph Nader were in attendance.  
 This large and diverse guest list came with a similarly daunting set of (sometimes 
competing) agendas. Among their demands, various groups included opposing China’s 
admission to the WTO, awarding member nations control over decisions about which goods to 
include in domestic markets, and honoring the environmental and public health standards of 
individual nations. Concerns were aired about the environment and workers’ rights, but also 
about the future of small farmers, the burden of debt on developing nations, and the rights of 
women, students, and consumers worldwide.  
 In some cases, surprising coalitions formed, as these groups discovered common ground 
and worked through their differences. As the LA Times put it, Seattle showed us “Hard hats and 
longshoremen standing with granola crunchers and tree huggers, bus drivers and carpenters with 
snake dancers and organic food activists”. Playing off of the sight of union workers marching 
alongside demonstrators decked out in sea turtle costumes, at least one sign rejoiced, “Teamsters 
and Turtles Together at Last”.  
 But not all differences could be reconciled, and not every group hoped for the same 
outcome from the demonstrations. Some wanted to reform the WTO, IMF, and World Bank into 
ethical governing bodies, while others wanted some or all of these institutions abolished 
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completely. Of those who wanted an end to the WTO, some called for a new, more democratic 
globalization, while others wanted smaller, more locally-focused governments and economic 
systems. The one thing they all wanted was to shut down the Millennium round of talks, and 
make their own voices heard.  
 As I mentioned in the last chapter, how we think of the rhetorical situation matters here. 
Because both supporters and detractors of the demonstrators accept a narrow definition of the 
situation, they find themselves bound by it. The demonstrations become an assemblage of 
rhetorics, sent out with a single goal: shut it down. The protestors have no choice but to insist 
that they changed the world, and critics like Friedman have no choice but to argue that events 
would have played out just the same without them. N30 veterans point to the breakdown in the 
talks and say “we did that,” while critics point out the flaws in this argument. Did they or didn’t 
they shut down the WTO in 1999? This seems to be the question that consumes both sides.  
 The point here is not to answer that question, but to ask what the difficulty we have in 
answering it means about the significance of these events. It can’t be as easy as saying that 
“Seattle” equals all of the testimonies, opinions, experiences, and images of that day, thus 
allowing us to wash our hands of it. Whether what happened was “protestors shut down the 
WTO” or not, *something* happened. What, though, is a difficult question to answer. As the title 
of Rebecca and David Solnit’s account, The Battle of the Story of the Battle of Seattle, suggests, 
the conflict on N30 was as much about language as anything else. In my research, I have heard 
the same event called the Battle of, in, and for Seattle – and each variation lends a slightly 
different nature to the encounter. Was the battle in this city, or for this city? Why call it a battle, 
and not something else? I have struggled with my own terms while writing this. If not a battle, 
are the events of that week a riot? Or a protest? Or a demonstration? To call the participants 
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protestors seems potentially unsympathetic (although I do at times). To call them demonstrators 
seems more neutral, and so I have probably leaned more heavily on that term. But if this is a 
demonstration, and these are demonstrators – a demonstration of what? Everyone involved 
(myself not excluded) is locked into a war of words.  
"5 DAYS THAT SHOOK THE WORLD" 
 Although the events of what came to be called N30 (for November 30
th
, the opening day 
of the talks) are well documented, the chaos of that week makes a partial account well worth 
assembling here. Fixing a timeline is complicated because court cases involving demonstrators 
were not fully settled until 2007, so any ending to the demonstrations is artificial. If the extended 
legal battles make a end-point difficult to establish it’s similarly difficult to pinpoint the moment 
events in Seattle begin. Does it start when Seattle was chosen for the site? Or when the first 
emails and bulletin board messages went out, proposing ideas for the demonstrations? Even 
setting the date to coincide with the arrival of protestors in the city is messy. Demonstrators had 
been massing for some time before N30, holding meetings and festivities both for themselves 
and the public, but they, like the WTO, seem to have regarded the evening of the 29
th
 as the 
opening reception. I have chosen to end with December 3
rd
, even though the events set in motion 
that week drag on for years after, because it is the end point for the WTO talks. As protestors 
gather around the police station to agitate for the release of their arrested colleagues, the fight 
against the WTO starts to give way to a fight against the city. For the purposes of this document, 
then, I will focus on Monday the 29
th
 of November through Friday, December 3
rd
 – what 
Alexander Cockburn and Jeffrey St. Clair’s book calls “5 days that shook the world.”  
 Monday – N29: The day before WTO talks opened. Various groups involved in the 
protest held teach-ins (as they had been for some days) about issues related to the WTO and 
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globalization. Farmer and activist Jose Bove stationed himself at a McDonalds at 3
rd
 and Pine, 
handing out samples of Roquefort cheese smuggled in tariff-free . Seduced by his words (or his 
cheese) the crowd, including customers, got slightly out of hand and a window was broken, 
although not by Bove (Thomas 28). The evening brought music and dancing, a film showing, 
and an interfaith service. In spite of the rain, several thousand people (largely Jubilee 2000 
participants) gathered around the Exhibition Center to sing and pray for debt relief in developing 
countries, as WTO delegates met inside for their opening reception. While some tension did 
exist, all in all, the protestors were exuberant, police were indulgent, and citizens were tolerant.  
 Tuesday – N30: On Tuesday, though, the atmosphere changed. Protestors knew they 
were required to abide by a “no-protest” zone close to the site of the talks, but they nonetheless 
successfully prevented many delegates from ever reaching the safety of that zone. Relying on 
Seattle’s cramped streets, they had long since planned to block off every intersection 
approaching the no-protest zone. WTO participants who overcame the resulting traffic were 
prevented from attending the talks by human chains blocking the access of both vehicles and 
pedestrians.  
 The demonstrators who made up the human chains had agreed ahead of time to risk 
arrest, and were composed mostly of students.  Assembling in the intersections, they secured 
themselves together with chains, tape, wires, PVC pipes, and other materials, making it 
impossible for police to move them without either dismantling everything or injuring the 
members of the chain. Cautioned to let no one in, but to offer no resistance or violence, many 
protestors report waiting passively, even as delegates shoved at them and yelled. Jeffrey St. Clair 
recalls one delegate pulling a gun on them, although nothing came of it (24).  
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 If delegates were shoving though, of course some protestors were shoving back. And 
refusing to fight didn’t mean refusing to yell at WTO participants that they weren’t working 
today, or that no one wanted them in Seattle. Although some delegates (particularly those from 
Europe, where the labor movement is stronger) shrugged this behavior off, others felt angry, 
intimidated by demonstrators, or disgusted with Seattle officials for not preventing these 
displays.  
 Meanwhile, opening ceremonies were scheduled to begin, but only a few participants had 
been able to get to them. Under pressure by organizers and the mayor to get the delegates into 
the talks, the police moved against protestors. The Seattle Fire Department had already refused to 
turn their hoses on the protestors, so police relied on tear gas and pepper spray. Participants 
interviewed by Janet Thomas report seeing police tear the protective bandanas from faces, or 
pulling up demonstrators that had curled into defensive balls so that they could spray their faces 
directly with the pepper spray (Thomas 87). Those in the chains, many without the use of their 
arms, obviously suffered the most, unable to escape or defend themselves against the rubber 
bullets or tear gas aimed at them. In spite of this, the gas failed as a dispersal technique. Those 
who could move either scattered, only to regroup when the smoke cleared, or stayed to try and 
aid their immobile colleagues. Opening ceremonies were canceled, and those delegates that 
hadn’t already ventured out were told to stay in their hotel rooms.  
 The first store windows were smashed around noon, after police had already clashed with 
demonstrators. Reports vary as to the number of participants involved in the vandalism, although 
both sides agree that the number was very small in comparison to the total number of protestors. 
Some witnesses claim the vandals were a small group, perhaps 20, while others suggest there 
may have been as many as 200. These black-clad protestors have been connected to the Black 
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Bloc, one of the groups affiliated with the demonstrations.  Armed with hammers or other blunt 
weapons, their window-smashing was aimed at well-known chains and big-box stores. Local 
businesses, it seems, were largely left alone. Moreover, some protestors seem to have tried to 
halt the vandalism, urging them to embrace non-violence
6
 and attempting to protect the store 
windows.  Nonetheless, shoppers were alarmed, and storeowners closed early, or boarded-up 
their windows to protect them. Organizers had feared that violence (to humans or property) 
would distract from their message, and their concerns proved well-founded as media coverage 
centered on clouds of gas and shattering windows. In many ways, for those watching the 
demonstrations on the news, these windows would come to characterize the Battle in Seattle, and 
those who participated in it. 
 While protestors and police clashed in the streets, a planned march by the AFL-CIO was 
wrapping up. Originally, union members had agreed to join the rest of the demonstrations after 
their march, but a last minute offer to allow union reps a seat at the WTO table in return for 
abandoning the protests changed all that. Organizers led marchers away from the original route, 
and down a new one, away from the site of the WTO, the other protestors, and their struggles 
with the police. Many AFL-CIO members obeyed, but others were confused or angered by the 
change of plans and deviated from the new route to meet up with their allies as planned. Their 
numbers swelled the ranks of the demonstrators significantly, although not as much as the 
"civilian" protestors might have hoped.  
 By the end of the day, city and state officials had declared a state of emergency, and 
imposed a 7pm curfew. Some protestors had been arrested (about 70), but many more had 
endured pepper spray, tear gas, rubber bullets, concussion grenades, or blows from the batons of 
                                                          
6
 Some Black Bloc members (by no means a homogenous group itself) insisted at the time (and some 
continue to insist) that destruction of corporate property should not be labeled “violence” (ACME Collective).  
54 
 
police in riot gear. Some protestors were caught, gassed, and released, perhaps to be gassed again 
later. The news showed two images over and over: officers in Robocop-style black armor, and 
breaking windows.  
 Wednesday – D1: Downtown Seattle was declared a no-protest zone, expanding the 
original boundaries, and the city temporarily rendered purchasing or carrying a gas mask illegal. 
Many expressed outrage over these attacks on civil rights, and even President Clinton publicly 
said that some protestors should be allowed to observe the talks. Perhaps unsurprisingly, these 
measures failed to keep demonstrators out of the streets, and this time neither they nor the police 
had as much patience.  
 The second official day of protest wasn’t messier than the first, but certainly something 
had changed. The previous day had established a precedent for violence which the second day 
both met and exceeded. Police went so far as to chase some protestors into the near-by Capitol 
Hill neighborhood, although it was outside of the no-protest zone. Residents of the neighborhood 
were gassed for being in the wrong place at the wrong time, or because it was impossible to tell 
who was a protestor and who wasn’t. Some residents fled, and others joined in the protest out of 
anger at the invasion of their neighborhood. Perhaps reacting to criticism over their 
ineffectiveness on Tuesday, police arrested some 500 people. 
 Meanwhile, the President’s much-anticipated visit fell flat, where it didn’t do actual 
harm. Concessions he’d promised to the world’s poorest nations weren’t delivered, and his 
insistence on the necessity of including labor standards in WTO deals angered and alarmed 
developing nations, who saw this as pandering to union “bullying”. Union members 
demonstrating in the streets, meanwhile, were unimpressed with his half-measures.  
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 Thursday – D2 : By this point, both police and protestors were exhausted, but still in the 
streets. Inside the talks, harassed and tear-gassed delegates vented their own frustrations, 
especially in light of Clinton’s short and disappointing visit. The willingness of participants to 
work together suffered noticeably, and The Guardian reports that US trade representative 
Barshefsky was mocked when she attempted to open a morning session. Similarly, a US attempt 
to call an unscheduled session on labor standards fell apart when Pakistan declared it illegal and 
threatened to sabotage talks in every working group. Other countries responded in kind, and a 
number of African delegates protested their exclusion from an agricultural deal being worked out 
between the US and EU. The scene inside the talks began to resemble the scene outside.  
 Friday – D3: Demonstrators and Seattlites gathered to protest the arrests, calling for 
officials to “Free the Seattle 600.” The talks, such as they were, wound down at the WTO, with 
nothing resolved.   
SEATTLE’S LEGACY 
 As mentioned above, Cockburn and St. Clair call these events “5 days that shook the 
world.” But who did the shaking, exactly? And what was left when the dust settled? What was 
accomplished during these five days seems to depend on who you ask. While the talks reportedly 
“fell apart,” and supporters claim this was due to the demonstrations, others insist the two are 
only loosely related, if at all. Janet Thomas says, “It was a parade and everybody came. But you 
had to be there. If you weren’t, it was a week of shame, a shocking example of violence and 
mayhem, a blight on Seattle’s shining reputation, a disgrace” (12). Her quote neatly sums up 
discrepancies between accounts of the events in Seattle. Those who opposed the movement told 
broad, sweeping stories of global embarrassment or pathetic futility that glossed over the 
individuals and smaller groups involved and made much of a few broken windows. Participants 
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and supporters, on the other hand, tended to glamorize the individual, telling personal stories of 
triumph or hardship while distancing themselves from what other protestors (particularly those 
breaking windows or fighting back) did or didn’t do.  
 This reliance on personal narrative permeates supportive accounts of N30. As a rhetorical 
tactic, the personal narratives work to shed light on the motivations of select individuals, and to 
gain sympathy from readers who are granted front-row seats to police brutality. In answering 
questions about what happened, though, these accounts seem limited and unreliable. In 5 Days 
That Shook the World, Cockburn and St. Clair argue that the demonstrations put issues like 
sweatshops, labor struggles, world debt, and unequal trade exchanges on the center stage, but the 
text itself contains only anecdotes and a diary of the events; Janet Thomas’s The Battle in Seattle 
tells personal stories – and those only from Northwesterners, excluding the voices of those who 
came to the protests from other parts of the country, or from overseas. The reader sees the Battle 
of Seattle, and the causes leading up to it, only through the eyes of Seattlites and their immediate 
neighbors.  
 Many of these narratives echo the sentiments expressed by Janet Thomas above. If you 
were there, you knew you’d changed the world. If you weren’t though, things became muddier. 
One claim made by demonstrators is that the WTO talks collapsed in part (or wholly) due to their 
efforts. Certainly most participants of the protests believe that their actions directly or indirectly 
led to the collapse of the talks. Detractors tell a different story. Thomas Friedman, one of the 
most vocal critics, wrote (even as events were still unfolding) “Is there anything more ridiculous 
in the news today than the protests against the World Trade Organization in Seattle?” Calling 
demonstrators a “Noah’s ark of flat-earth advocates, protectionist trade unions and yuppies 
looking for their 1960’s fix,” he claims that protestors had been “duped by knaves like Pat 
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Buchanan […] into thinking that power lies with the WTO.” Since the WTO can accomplish 
nothing anyway, he suggests, demonstrators are only making a spectacle of themselves, causing 
property damage and national embarrassment over nothing.  
 Ironically, Friedman goes on to deride their “circus” and says “You make a difference 
today by using globalization – by mobilizing the power of trade, the power of the Internet and 
the power of consumers to persuade, or embarrass, global corporations and nations to upgrade 
their standards. You change the world when you get the big players to do the right things for the 
wrong reasons. But that takes hard work – coalition-building with companies and consumers, 
and follow-up.” Some of his critique is valid (and anticipates the success of buy-local 
movements like those discussed in the preceding chapter) but he seems unaware that protestors 
*did* harness the power of globalization and coalition-building, to mobilize consumers, NGOs, 
small companies, and others. Friedman’s problem seems to be that they marshaled these things 
for the wrong ideology. His commentary indicates how distorted the message of the protestors 
became, but more importantly says something about the lack of cooperation in all these 
rhetorical competitions. We might expect Friedman to see the globalized network of protestors 
either as hypocrisy or as a circumstance that adds nuance to their arguments, but ultimately he 
does neither. Like the narratives of the demonstrators, only one side of the story is being told 
here.  
 Nor is Friedman alone in this narrow vision of the demonstrators’ failure. Friedman’s 
comments are representative of a series of claims that the protests were firecrackers – all smoke 
and flash, no real damage done or lasting impression left.  This is true even of those who 
acknowledge the clout of the WTO, who dismiss the demonstrators by basing their objections on 
claims about the destabilizing effect of factors outside the demonstrations. Things fell apart, they 
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admit, but not because of a few teamsters and turtles. Echoing sentiments like Friedman’s about 
the futility of the protests, an article in the New York Times on December 2
nd
 takes a different 
approach and calls the clash a “warning for both sides” ("Messages"). Protestors’ messages were 
lost in vandalism, and the WTO received a slap on the wrist for being too insular and insensitive 
to environmental and labor issues. The WTO, they suggest, would be wise to learn from the 
demonstrations, but they argue that more damage was done to the demonstrators’ causes than to 
the organization’s. Another piece a few days later goes further, arguing that experts had already 
condemned the Millennium Round of talks as premature, and thus “the failed talks auger no 
general calamity.” Instead they suggest “Trade will continue to be governed by rules that have 
served the trading community well for over 50 years” ("Collapse"). This isn’t to say that no 
damage at all was done – for instance, the failed talks meant that certain trade barriers would last 
longer, and reforms be delayed still longer – but in the end the Times seem confident that these 
changes will still take place, albeit later. The Guardian makes similar observations, pointing out 
that even before either side began arriving in Seattle, tensions between the delegates were 
already showing, and they had failed to agree on more than two paragraphs of the lengthy draft 
ministerial declaration. Many seemed to feel that the talks had been called too soon and were 
doomed from the start, protestors or no.  
 There’s another way to think about this, however. Some supporters argue that to bicker 
about who closed down what misses the point. The world was still changed, they say, but the 
changes were less physical and more ideological. Whether or not the demonstrations had much 
impact on the WTO itself, or world economics, some insist that it worked wonders for 
individuals struggling with their seeming impotence in a globalized world. Ronnie Cummins, 
director of the Purefood Campaign claims that “Seattle made people feel as if they had some 
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power once again” (Cockburn 7). In Multitude  Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri call Seattle 
"the first global protest," and argue that it represents "the first major protest against the global 
system as a whole, the first real convergence of the innumerable grievances against the injustices 
and inequalities of the global system" and claim that it "opened a cycle of similar protests" (286). 
And The Art of Protest suggests that while the magnitude of the change is debatable, those who 
study resistance and social movements can at least agree that Seattle “represent[s] a turning point 
at which forces arrayed against corporate globalization took on a new level of self-awareness and 
confidence” (Reed 241).  Those dismayed at the damage they perceived as the result of 
globalized capital found themselves in a network of like-minded potentially allies. Alliances 
were forged, and common ground  was found (sometimes, such as with the Teamsters and 
turtles, in unexpected places). Those accustomed to being ignored or silenced fought back, for 
the world to see, and if not everyone really “got” what they were about, they at least sat up and 
took notice.  
 And at least one change can’t be disputed by either side of the debate. Events in Seattle 
also represented, for the US, a new standard in how cities respond to demonstrations. Seattle's 
police were criticized for being underprepared, for being unable to  clear streets, for their 
brutality toward protestors. Police Chief Norm Stamper lost his job in the aftermath of the 
demonstrations, and Seattle became a lesson to other cities. Janet Thomas laments that in some 
ways the conversation after N30 became more about how the police should have responded, and 
how they might respond in the future than about the justice of any of the issues raised by 
protestors. Rather than encouraging citizens to question the status quo, Seattle instead prompted 
officials to re-think police procedures and crowd control in urban environments. Rather than 
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becoming a narrative about citizen engagement (whether beneficial or harmful engagement), for 
many Seattle serves to bolster narratives about domestic terrorism.  
"THE WHOLE WORLD IS WATCHING" 
 Seattle’s most lasting impact might be in these competing narratives – triumph, national 
embarrassment, citizenship, terrorism – and in the images of the protests. As I hinted at above, 
since 1999, stories (some true, some false) and footage from the demonstrations have been used 
to prep police in other cities for the possibility of civil disobedience. Images of fire in the streets 
and broken glass are used to alarm officials, citizens, and police, while from the other side 
images of the gassed and helpless protestors are used to win sympathy and prepare potential 
demonstrators in other cities for the abuse they may face. The story, and the images that 
accompany it, are so compelling that in 2007 Stuart Townsend made his directorial debut with 
Battle in Seattle, a film bearing the tagline “The whole world is watching.”  
 Townsend’s film, as one of the best recognized representations of the events of N30, is 
worth a closer look. The film follows a small group of protestors: Jay, presumably meant to 
represent a Direct Action Network leader, haunted by the death of his brother in a protest some 
years ago; Lou, a middle-class deserter with a threadbare tough-guy attitude, who set fire to her 
father’s lab in protest of his animal testing; law-student Samantha, who wants to help but is 
horrified and frightened by the violence she sees; and easy-going and oft-arrested Django, played 
by Outkast’s Andre 3000, who is what might be described as a career activist. These four are  
followed through a brief portrayal of opening ceremonies, into the escalation of police violence 
and protestor vandalism on Tuesday, past Wednesday’s stubborn refusal to quit the streets 
(where Lou, Django, and finally Jay are arrested), and through the end of the week, where Jay 
and company learn from protestors outside the jail that talks have fallen through, and that most 
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of them will be released. Mixed up in this is Dale, a police officer whose wife is mistakenly 
injured by officers during the confusion, and who beats Jay savagely in the aftermath of learning 
his wife’s injuries have resulted in a miscarriage.  
 My synopsis undoubtedly gives some sense of potential problems with the narrative of 
the film. Aside from isolated moments (Django tries to explain to the press why the WTO is 
harmful, a Doctors Without Borders representative is furious that everyone is more interested in 
the protests than in hearing his plea for aid) much of the focus of the film is on individual 
tensions. We see the mayor of Seattle getting pressure from the governor of Washington, and in 
turn putting pressure on the police chief. Jay and Lou become romantically involved, and the 
film dwells on Lou’s concerns that Jay is a coward because he lacks her militancy, and Jay's 
preoccupation as he is haunted by his brother’s death. Samantha yearns to help but worries about 
her legal career and is unable to bring herself to be part of the violence she sees. Early in the 
film, Dale’s wife agonizes over her fear that she’s not ready to have a baby, and we later see 
Dale’s anguish7 when he is denied time off from work after she miscarries. Like the memoirs 
written by N30 participants, the film is most interested in the stories of individuals.  
 Given that it is, after all, a film and not a documentary, this makes sense, but in showing 
us Seattle the film allows us to hear only a few voices. In the interest of keeping the story 
moving, these voices belong to characters who fit a particular mold - they must have interesting 
reasons for being involved, must have personal conflicts to resolve, and must be sympathetic. 
                                                          
7
 It seems worth mentioning here that police were also victims of these events, which the film does make 
clear. Many of them suffered from fatigue and stress. In spite of being well-prepared for the possibility of violence, 
some officers were not provided with food or sufficient time to take breaks to eat, or even use the restroom. It 
seems likely that a certain amount of the violence could be attributed to a police force edgy about whether 
protestors would be violent themselves, while wearing heavy riot gear for hours without a break or a meal. There 
are accounts of demonstrators (who were equipped with water and food, gas masks or bandanas, and even 
diapers) offering to share food and water with police. Not every confrontation between the two sides was 
uncongenial.  
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They must also allow Townsend to show as much of the action as possible, with the result that 
the protagonists move from one location to another, seeming to exist outside the protests rather 
than as integrated parts of them. We are not exposed to the perspective of anyone who stayed in 
the human chain for half a day, for example, and we see nothing from the perspective of those 
breaking windows, or of the police officer who mistakenly (or uncaringly) assaults Dale’s 
pregnant wife during the smoke and confusion. The film falls into the same pattern as accounts 
like those of Cockburn and Thomas, unable to take in the wide and diverse body of participants, 
and picking out a few heroes and victims to focus on.  
 This is to be expected, though. The film does what its genre demands. But the 
emotionally engaging qualities of narrative, for the film as for the accounts, come at a price. 
Even as the film shows us individuals like Django and the Doctors Without Borders 
representative, trying to make their silenced voices heard, the film itself can only function by 
silencing voices. As with the written accounts, there are no representations of other places – 
Seattle is Sam’s home and the others (aside from Lou, who shows every sign of staying with Jay 
anyway) appear to reside there as well. The whole world may be watching, but there are limits to 
what they are able to see.  
 The narrative of the film also works to perpetuate harmful myths about events in Seattle. 
One of these is, perhaps obviously, about violence. Although a dramatic showdown between Jay, 
Lou, and some window-breaking vigilantes (presumably members of the Black Bloc) condemns 
their vandalism, saying it will only give the media something to feed on and distract from the 
real issues the film itself dwells, almost lovingly, on the images of the shattering windows. 
(Perhaps in order to avoid royalties issues, Battle is also unable to portray how even these acts of 
supposedly random lawlessness were calculated. The film shows broken glass, panicked 
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shoppers, storeowners putting boards up to protect their stores. What we don’t see is the contrast 
between local businesses – which were largely left alone – and stores like Niketown, which were 
targeted.) The movie, like some demonstrators and many officials and observers, deplores the 
“violence” of the Black Bloc in breaking these windows. As mentioned before, though, the group 
itself has been quick to argue (and to suggest that this stance was the motivation behind their 
action on N30) that to label their broken windows violence is to equate corporate property with 
human lives. Because they reject this elevation of corporate property, they insist that what they 
did was not violent (ACME Collective). Some protestors blame them for distorting the meaning 
of the protests, while Black Bloc members might argue that what they did was, for them, the 
*point* of the protests. 
 But the film also dwells on the police violence. Much is made of the battered protestors, 
innocents caught in the crossfire (including Dale’s wife and one undercover police officer, both 
of whom are mistaken for protestors and beaten) and Dale’s misplaced anger when he attacks 
Jay. The scene in which the grieving police officer batters the unresisting protestor is perhaps the 
longest moment of sustained violence in the film, much longer than the quick incidents between 
police and other protestors, which almost seem casual by comparison. Dale’s violence is what we 
are closest to, and by this point in the film, we are prepared to accept that perhaps he has “good 
reasons” for his rage. When Dale comes to apologize to the incarcerated demonstrator, Jay (with 
one eye drooping and blackened, his lip split, and his face painfully swollen) suggests that the 
two of them have been swept up in larger forces, pitted against one another for reasons other than 
those they might have chosen.  
 In spite of this moment, the film remains about the clash between “good” and “bad” 
protestors, or between protestors and police, and the message of the protestors is largely buried 
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underneath, as are their motivations. In the scene where Django attempts to explain the reasoning 
behind the demonstrations to a reporter, she ultimately turns away, uninterested in his articulate 
and calm response, distracted by the chaos around her. And Django later points out in jail that 
before the protests, people didn’t even know what the WTO was – and now, well, they still don’t 
know what it is, only that it’s bad. His wry comment is meant to illustrate the importance of baby 
steps, of slow progress, but it also highlights the limits of what the protestors were able to 
accomplish. In The Battle for the Story of the Battle of Seattle, N30 veteran Solnit points out that 
Townsend didn’t actively seek out any participants of N30, with the result (Solnit feels) that the 
motivations of the characters are skewed. We see multiple flashbacks to the day Jay’s brother 
died, as if only this could explain both his intense loyalty to his cause and his devotion to 
nonviolence, and it’s clear that Lou feels obligated to atone for the sins of her father, so that “The 
myth here is that people protest or rebel because they – not the system – have a problem” (Solnit 
45). The film makes Dale’s violence into a father’s grief, and the violence of the protestors 
(safely limited to the breaking windows) is seen as the work of a fringe group whose motives are 
little more than to cause chaos. Towards the end of the film, a newly resolute Samantha goes into 
the mayor’s office to urge him to release the protestors, with the law firmly on her side. Civil 
disobedience is saved by the power of one person working within the system.  
CONSEQUENCES 
 That ultimately the institutions of legal rights save the day is an important message given 
the uneasy relationship between citizenship and protest. The rhetoric of the film presents Jay and 
his fellows as prophets, accusers, or as soldiers, but not necessarily as participants in civic life. 
Because of that, it is difficult to picture the work of protest, inside this film, as the work of 
citizens. In some ways, the film even makes it difficult to see the demonstrations as work at all, 
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citizenly or otherwise. At times, Battle suggests that the demonstrations were a spontaneous 
uprising, or a relatively small protest that got out of hand. Early in the film, we see police 
examining the files of the four protagonists, expressing their uncertainty about what the 
demonstrators will do, and their concern that things may turn violent. All in all, they seem kept 
in the dark, and when WTO delegates are unable to get through the human chains the film shows 
both mayor and police chief responding with confused surprise. Several misleading things are 
going on here.  
 First, although it’s true that a number of previously-uninvolved citizens swelled the 
protestors’ numbers spontaneously when police gassed residential neighborhoods, in reality the 
demonstrations were meticulously planned. A comment in the film, made by Jay, refers to 6 
months planning, but meetings about the WTO talks and what the reaction to them should be 
began as early as February 1999, about a month after Seattle was chosen for the Ministerial 
Conference. These meetings continued to be held monthly and by September organizers needed 
to secure a larger space to hold the participants. By October they were seeing 500+ at meetings 
and plans were already being finalized for WTO week (Thomas 128). And these numbers can’t 
begin to represent the number of participants on email lists and message boards, who were 
unable to be present in Seattle until the week of the protests or at all. What often comes off like a 
spontaneous uprising was a year’s worth of work, for both the protestors and the unions.  
 Nor was the city taken by surprise by reactions to the WTO. Not only did demonstrators 
make their intentions known to officials, but many citizens uninvolved in the demonstrations 
expressed ambivalence about inviting the WTO to liberal Seattle. In fact, in August of 1999, 
People for Fair Trade convinced King County to call for a resolution not to host the WTO at all, 
and were defeated 8 to 5 (Thomas 128). Far from being the work of a few masterminds with 
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legions at their command, Seattle happened as it did because large numbers of citizens, working 
both inside and outside official channels, and organizing cooperatively with one another, devoted 
a great deal of time and energy to expressing their opinions. Believing openness would serve 
them best, demonstration organizers made no attempt to hide their plans or hold secret meetings, 
so city officials had every opportunity to follow the evolution of the protests. And as mentioned 
before, a carnival of sorts took place in the week before the WTO opening ceremonies, with 
protestors from all over the country beginning to converge on Seattle, so surely some idea of the 
numbers must have been apparent to city officials. In the days before N30, some newspapers 
even ran itineraries of events linked to the demonstrations. The idea that all of Seattle 
wholeheartedly embraced the WTO, and was then surprised by spontaneous protesting is 
ludicrous. Perhaps more importantly, the idea that the protests were spontaneous, that this degree 
of civic participation happens naturally and effortlessly, is both ludicrous and dangerous.  
 I call these myths dangerous because they add to the difficulty we have in discussing 
what citizenship means, and what counts as an act of citizenship. Demonstrators chanted about 
“the power of the people,” and that “this is what democracy looks like,” but critics like Friedman 
spoke of them as misguided at best and thugs or traitors at worst. This response is a far cry from 
our exhortations to vote, proud stickers on Election Day for doing your duty, billboards 
reminding us to make our voices heard. Because the situation around these protagonists is one of 
violence (and violence that is portrayed as motivated by personal tensions, or caused by 
ineffable, irresistible larger forces), and because the actions of the protagonists are presented as 
spontaneous and/or illegal (the film opens with the group trespassing to hang a banner), it 
becomes impossible to see them as citizens. They act out of a sense of moral convictions, 
certainly, but not civic responsibility.   
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 An example of how this confusion over what citizenship is manifests in the treatment of 
demonstrators by Seattle’s then-mayor Paul Schell. In the film, Mayor Schell references his 
experience as a former Vietnam protestor to gain the goodwill of the demonstrators. He 
expresses his solidarity and admiration of them, saying he is willing for their “voice to be heard,” 
but ends by warning them to “be tough on your issues, but be gentle on my town.” The real 
Schell, who spent the 70s working for the Department of Community Development and was 
instrumental in having then-threatened Pike Place Market remain in public hands, has a record 
that suggests his cinematic sympathy was not feigned. And yet it was he (both in the film and in 
real life) who ordered the police to clear the protestors.  
 Because we find it so difficult to define or discuss citizenship, it is perhaps unsurprising 
that Schell is able to applaud the demonstrators as good citizens one day, and consider them 
criminals in the days following. What it means to “do citizenship” becomes slippery. It seems 
clear that informing yourself and taking a position is the mark of a good citizen. Speaking out 
against certain actions on the part of organizations or governments is also good citizenship – but 
only to a point. Inconveniencing others in the name of your principles, actually causing change 
outside the approved channels of votes, appeals and inoffensive, considerate demonstration – 
these things seem to transgress the parameters of citizenship. It is as if the citizen is always a step 
away from the criminal. What seems like “public” space, as the Seattle crowds learned, becomes 
corporate space or government space. It is easy to slide from occupying public property to 
trespassing, with all the legal consequences implied in the term. Both the critics’ accounts then, 
and that of the film, seem to rely in part on distancing themselves from citizenship. Lunatic thugs 
clearly can’t be acting out of civic responsibility, but the narrative of an unexpected uprising also 
clashes with our ideas about citizen identity.  
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 Instead, while the film comes down wholeheartedly on the side of the triumphant 
demonstrators, it does so by painting them neither as criminals nor citizens. It clearly takes as its 
position the belief that the demonstrators shut down the WTO, portraying the Battle in Seattle as 
exactly that – a battle, the opening (victorious) salvo in a war. But in framing Seattle using 
military rhetoric, there are consequences. First, the film is able to neatly keep citizens on one 
side and protest on the other. The protagonists are soldiers, and thus heroes, but soldiers aren’t 
civilians, and the violence soldiers occasionally need to exhibit is not a responsibility of citizens. 
“Innocent” bystanders such as Dale’s wife are not drawn into this conflict other than as 
casualties; by the end of the film she and her husband are reconciled and while he may need to 
live with his guilt for battering Jay, she is absolved of the responsibility of speaking out against 
the conditions that led to these protests. Her part, as a citizen, is to be protected, by police 
(whether on the right side or the wrong side) or by heroic protesting soldiers.  
CONCLUSIONS 
 We end then where we began, in a war of words, and it is here that I want to return to 
Burke's cooperative competition as a way of moving past that war. Rather than remaining in an 
entrenched position, cooperative competition asks participants to be open to one another in 
solving a problem, without asking them to compromise on what they want. Because of this, not 
everyone will actually get what they want in cooperative competition; Burke suggests only that 
participation will be transformative and allow differing voices to transcend the limits of their 
own position. Chantal Mouffe describes something similar when she argues that democratic 
theorists should work toward “the creation of a vibrant ‘agonistic’ public sphere of contestation” 
(3), one where conflict can be worked out between adversaries rather than enemies. In contrast to 
antagonism, “a we/they relation in which the two sides are enemies who do not share any 
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common ground, agonism is a we/they relation where the conflicting parties, although 
acknowledging that there is no rational solution to their conflict, nevertheless recognize the 
legitimacy of their opponents” (20). In agonistic conflict, as in cooperative competition, no one 
is guaranteed to get what they want, but each agrees to respect the other and to leave themselves 
open to being changed by other participants.  
 We see this most clearly in the much-circulated accounts of Teamsters and Turtles. In a 
lengthy passage of Multitude, Hardt and Negri argue that the real significance of the 
demonstrations was in providing a "convergence center" for diverse groups with intersecting or 
similar concerns: 
The magic of Seattle was to show that these many grievances were not just a random, 
haphazard collection, a cacophony of different voices, but a chorus that spoke in common 
against the global system. ... [The] various affinity groups come together or converge not 
to unite into one large centralized group; they remain different and independent but lock 
together in a network structure. The network defines both their singularity and their 
commonality. (288) 
 
The narrative accounts of participants speak to this, as many of them describe being transformed, 
or being caught up in something magical.  In the aftermath of the demonstrations, The Nation 
spoke optimistically of the newly-minted alliances, claiming that supposed enemies such as 
"Machinists and antilogging activists didn't just march together, they learned from each other," 
and quoted one steelworker as saying "Now, after hanging out with these green kids, I know 
there's another way to do this. We can preserve the old-growth trees. We can have sustainability. 
I guess I'm an environmentalist now" ("Democracy"). A similar spirit motivates the collection of 
organizers from both large and small activist groups into the Direct Action Network responsible 
for orchestrating so much of the demonstrations, or that of the participation of people from all 
walks of life, with diverse affiliations, in the human chains that blocked WTO delegates from 
reaching the conference. Part of what makes these cooperative moments so appealing was the 
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sense that individual groups maintained their autonomy and individual goals, while taking one 
another seriously as partners in a conversation about how to tackle public problems. 
 A spirit of cooperative competition might tell a story similar to the one I’ve begun here – 
about citizens who worked both inside and outside of institutions to make their voices heard and 
who in doing so were part of a larger movement of global citizens concerned about population, 
health care, labor rights, the environment, in short, the public good. Instead, the rhetoric of war 
seems more comfortable for us than difficult discussions about the boundaries of citizenship. We 
know a war is over when it is won, and until it is won, it continues to be a war
8
. Both 
Townsend’s film and the writing of N30 participants suggests that the battle of Seattle was 
decisively won, and is now over, the city safely defended.   
 In falling back on war-like discourse, the work that went into these connections, and 
subsequently did or did not go into maintaining them is lost, as subtleties are swept aside in the 
face of "us vs. them." Also lost are the attempts by those not on the battlefield to participate in 
the conversation about the global practices represented by the WTO. In the weeks leading up to 
the demonstrations, Hardt and Negri note that "High school teachers had focused their classes on 
global issues, university students had studied global trade, church groups and political activists 
had planned street theatre and held seminars on nonviolent protest, lawyers had organized teams 
of observers and legal aid in case of arrests" (285). Only some of these people would later be in 
the streets of Seattle, but all sought to be involved in the larger questions about how to address 
the world's problems. Similarly, in making the story of N30 the story of a battle in, of, or for 
Seattle, discussion around the demonstrations excises the history of world-wide protest that has 
attended the WTO since its birth, and ignores the global protests that occurred in solidarity with 
Seattle. The event becomes talked about as if it happened one time, in one place, or, at best, as if 
                                                          
8
 Witness the Wars on Drugs, Terror, Women, and Christmas, to name a few. 
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it somehow began something that moved on from there. In reality, the Seattle demonstrations 
were embedded in a web of similar conflicts, motivated by world-wide events, using tactics 
passed from one veteran protestor to another. 
 The final scenes of Townsend's film nod to this network, showing the four protagonists, 
newly released from jail, walking away together through the empty, debris-ridden streets. A 
darkened cinema displays the words “Thanks WTO It’s Been A Riot.” They seem to be heading 
to a bar, as Django is heard saying that the drinks are on him, and jokes “one down, a billion to 
go.” As the screen goes dark on them, an epilogue of words and images appears. The film lets us 
know that after Seattle “governments would never be caught off-guard again,” and that from then 
on 2-mile exclusion zones became the norm at protests. Scenes are shown from protests in Doha, 
Qatar (2001), where the WTO expressed a commitment to environmental safety and fair labor 
conditions, and Cancun, Mexico (2003), where developing countries again walked out on talks. 
The 36 million protesting the war in Iraq appear. By 2007, an update says, the promises made at 
Doha show little hope of fulfillment. Clashes between protestors and police appear, with the 
names of places like battlefields: Washington DC, Genoa, Switzerland, Ecuador, Miami, India, 
South Korea, Philippines, Honduras, Hong Kong, and finally “Everywhere.” The final message 
before the credits reads simply “The Battle continues…” 
 On the one hand, this ending undermines the false idea that the conflict in Seattle was 
"won," and is now finished. In these scenes, the demonstrations are connected to similar 
moments world-wide, and we are encouraged to see the work done in Seattle as ongoing, or at 
least to see ourselves as part of a world-wide army, which might be called to arms at any time. 
The rhetoric of war can show war, though, but not what comes after. And for Seattle, what came 
after was underwhelming. Demonstrators could not agree on whether their objective was to 
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eliminate or reform the WTO, and so it goes without saying that they had no long-term structure 
in place. The short-term goal of shutting down the talks, winning the battle, made it possible to 
avoid discussing longer-term goals about what demonstrators actually wanted from the WTO and 
their governments. Because the Battle in Seattle is part of a war, and not an act of citizenship, 
even the competing narratives within the demonstrations – globalization is bad, globalization can 
be a force for good, we must respect corporate property, vandalism is not violence – are never 
required to make use of their conflicts, to transcend their individual limitations. If Seattle was a 
battle, then the demonstrators may have won. If the work of protest is not warfare, though, and is 
instead something else, something more like civic engagement, then the work of protest doesn’t 
end with putting away our signs and putting out the fires in the streets.  
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Chapter 4 Rhetorical Agency and the "Shoe-Throwers' Index" 
 On December 17th 2010, frustrated fruit vendor Mohamed Bouazizi set fire to himself 
after police confiscated his cart. Unable to find other work, and repeatedly harassed by officials, 
either because he lacked proper permits or because he was unable or unwilling to bribe them, the 
26-year-old set himself on fire in protest. Other Tunisians,  sympathizing with his pain and 
humiliation, his unemployment and sense of helplessness, protested in the town of Sidi Bouzid. 
Reuters, calling Tunisia "one of the most prosperous and stable" countries in the region, 
commented on the unexpectedness of the "rioting." A month later, the Tunisian government had 
been overthrown, and Egyptians occupied the street, calling for a similar regime change. The 
Arab Spring had begun. 
 Revolutionaries and supporters on sites like Twitter and Facebook presented the Arab 
Spring as a fire of liberation, spreading inevitably from one place to the next. The relatively 
quick ousting of Tunisia's president (and later Egypt's)  aided this narrative, so that for many the 
revolution felt like a done deal even in countries where it had not yet "started." Many Arab 
leaders and state-run or monitored news sources, on the other hand, presented the outbreak as 
precisely that - an illness, brought on by foreign influences. These malicious, or at least 
misguided outsiders had infected a small group of young people with a discontent that would 
pass as long as they were dealt with sympathetically but firmly. A significant portion of the Arab 
Spring's global audience, however, including that in the United States, constructed a narrative 
about a long-oppressed people inevitably rebelling, successfully or not, against intolerable 
conditions in search of democracy and economic opportunity. 
 On February 3, 2011, amid continuing revolution in Egypt  and unrest in Yemen and 
Sudan, The Economist  published an article asking “Who will be next?” Several days later, The 
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Economist developed “The Shoe-Thrower’s Index,” an attempt to predict by mathematical 
calculation "where the scent of jasmine
9
 may spread next.” A month later, after (unforeseen) 
unrest in Bahrain and Libya, The Economist  introduced a revised, interactive version of the 
Index to its website. Its readers, amateurs and experts alike, could attempt to account for the 
current uprisings, and predict future ones, by tweaking the weight given to factors on the Index 
such as GDP per person or freedom of press. Predicting unrest in the Arab world became a game 
anyone could play. 
 This chapter is the most recent, but also represents the one with the widest concerns for 
citizenship. In the last chapter, participants were connected to a global movement, but still 
largely concentrated on a single city. Here, participants identify on both a national and regional 
level. This chapter also represents slightly different aims than those preceding it. Although I 
believe that revolution can be an act of citizenship, my argument is more about what discussion 
of revolution - as the act of an unhappy citizenry - reveals about contended citizens.  
 In this chapter, I will open with some background and discussion of the events popularly 
known as the "Arab Spring"
10
, and then examine the "Shoe-Throwers' Index" more closely. I 
argue that the Index, in attempting to explain or predict revolution, reduces the acts of Arab 
citizens (perhaps all citizens) to inevitable response to environment. This argument relies on a 
rhetoric of mathematics: introduce sufficient amounts of certain elements to a nation, and its 
people will explode in unrest; remove or reduce those elements, and the people will remain inert. 
                                                          
9
 A reference to the prevalence of the flower in Tunisia - prior to the participation of other countries, the 
events in Tunisia were referred to as the Jasmine Revolution. 
10
 The name "Arab Spring" is problematic to me. It establishes a sense of boundary that is utterly 
misleading, as if the events that began in late 2010 and played out all through 2011 can be severed cleanly and 
presented as a whole. To do this ignores the decades of Middle Eastern unrest that preceded that "spring," the 
escalation of that unrest in the years prior to Tunisia's uprising, and the messy and ongoing aftermath of the 
revolutions in countries such as Egypt and Syria. While I find myself using the term Arab Spring, it's important to 
keep in mind that it is an imperfect media construction.   
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I will also show that this attitude manifests in the language of some Arab leaders, who attempt to 
persuade their citizens that their countries don’t meet the “criteria” for revolution. This rhetoric 
relies on a predictive logic which, strangely enough, obscures its own use of rhetoric and fails to 
account for its influence, divorcing citizens' actions from their ability to persuade and be 
persuaded by others. Against this predictive logic, I will set the language used by some of the 
revolutionaries and their supporters, in particular those involved in Wael Ghonim's "Kullena 
Khaled Said" Facebook page. For these individuals, revolution is not simply a response to 
intolerable conditions, but an act of solidarity with others, and an opportunity to participate in 
creating  better conditions.  
MAPPING THE PATH OF PROTEST 
 The self-immolation of vendor Mohamed Bouazizi is popularly conceived of as the 
catalyst for the Arab Spring. In the two and a half weeks between the immolation and his death, 
as his story spread, his fellow Tunisians took to the streets, protesting the economic conditions 
and corruption that had driven Bouazizi to this extremity. In late December, after a week and a 
half of protesting, then-president Zine el Abidine Ben Ali appeared on television, appealing to 
protesters with both the carrot and the stick. While warning that the law "in all firmness" would 
come down on protesters, Ben Ali also reshuffled his government and promised that something 
would be done about Tunisia's high unemployment (Borger). After two more televised, 
increasingly conciliatory speeches, Ben Ali fled Tunisia on January 14th, ten days after 
Bouazizi's death. By this time, there had been protests in Algeria, including the self-immolation 
of Mohsen Bouterfif; unrest in Libya had prompted ruler Muammar Muhammad Abu Minyar al-
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Qaddafi to publically condemn the Tunisian protesters; and thousands of Egyptians had already 
promised on Facebook to attend the country's first Day of Rage
11
 on Jan 25th.  
 As January progressed, Egyptians occupied the streets, and protesters in Jordan, Lebanon, 
Palestine, and Yemen staged their own Days of Rage. Amid fire and violence, after the requisite 
three increasingly-desperate speeches, Hosni Mubarak resigned on February 11th. Although 
similar uprisings continued to occur in Algeria, Bahrain, Iran, and elsewhere, the next country to 
take the media stage was Libya, which by August had ousted Qaddafi, although not without 
intervention from the global community and the deaths of thousands. By the end of the year, 
Yemen, Syria, and Bahrain would join the list, with varying levels of change and bloodshed.  
 Discussions of the Arab Spring, in fact, often happen in list form. Many of the books on 
the subject, and the "Major events" section of the Wikipedia page are all organized in what is 
popularly perceived as the order of revolution: Tunisia, Egypt, Libya, Yemen, Syria, Bahrain. 
Visual representations expose some of the messiness behind these lists. One example, an 
interactive timeline on The Guardian's website, "The Path of Protest," gives some sense of how 
difficult it is to compose an orderly history of the Arab Spring (Blight et al). Seventeen Arab 
nations are included here, and the timeline assigns events one icon for protests or government 
responses to protests, another for the nebulous "political move" (usually an attempt by a leader to 
placate rebellious citizens), another for regime changes (not to be confused with the firing of a 
member of a president or leader's staff, which is considered a political move), and a fourth for 
international or external responses.  
                                                          
11
 The Days of Rage followed a series of protests beginning June 14th, 2010, referred to as the Silent 
Stands, during which protestors wore black and silently prayed or read from Bibles or the Quran, in protest of the 
brutal death of Khaled Said at the hands of Egyptian police. This was done in order to get around the emergency 
law, in place in Egypt since 1981, which made it impossible to protest openly. The Day of Rage was certainly a step 
further, but occurred neither in a vacuum nor as a direct result of the events in Tunisia.  
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 There are limits here as well. The icons are linked to news stories, so that the Path 
becomes less a map of events and more a map of media coverage. This means that the map 
begins with the death of Bouazizi, as the perceived catalyst, and includes no mention of earlier 
unrest. But regardless of how media coverage in the United States may have made it appear, 
Egypt's uprising was hardly spontaneous, nor was it a domino-like response to Tunisia's uprising. 
Long before Bouazizi's death, in late 2004, the Kefaya movement (the Egyptian Movement for 
Change whose name means "enough") held a small demonstration (fewer than 1000) calling for 
Mubarak to step down. Their protests continued regularly into 2005, and in May of that year 
protesters were attacked by police and Mubarak supporters.  Kefaya, though, had its origin in the 
years preceding 2005, including vocal protests against the war in Iraq. Egypt also experienced 
over 1900 demonstrations between 2004 and 2005 by labor movements (Rutherford 38). The 
April 6th Youth Movement emerged in the spring of 2008 to support one such demonstration by 
workers in El-Mahalla El-Kubra, and although public activism generated by the April 6th 
movement did not match their online presence, they nonetheless brought labor concerns to a 
wider audience and prompted political engagement in previously uninvolved citizens. And six 
months prior to Bouazizi's self-immolation, the "Kullena Khaled Said" Facebook page founded 
by Wael Ghonim, which I will discuss in greater detail later, was actively holding 
demonstrations.  
 The difficulty of showing the start of the Arab Spring isn't the only concern with "The 
Path of Protest." The map also ends, abruptly, at the end of 2011, although in many ways the 
events of 2011 continue today. Moreover, in assigning events linked to news stories to its four 
categories, the map both limits what becomes worthy of note, what counts as a "protest" or a 
"response," and tells us how to interpret events. The Silent Stands for Khaled Said in Egypt 
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referenced above, silent protests that preceded the Day of Rage, don't make it onto the map, for 
instance. International or external responses don't include online support within and outside of 
the Middle East. Government responses to protesters don't include the attempts by some Arab 
nations to post photos on Facebook and invite regime supporters to identify protesters. As much 
is happening off the Path as on it. These limitations notwithstanding, what the Path does show is 
how protests and demonstrations happened not like a fire spreading from one country to another, 
but like explosions with shrapnel landing all over. The idea that a domino of rebellion was tipped 
in Tunisia with Bouazazi's self-immolation and that what followed was the orderly, predictable 
toppling of other dominoes in the sequence, is an illusion crafted by media coverage. While this 
illusion of a coherent list is understandable, it impacts attempts to make sense of the Arab 
Spring. A feedback loop is created whereby the list influences rhetoric about the Arab Spring, 
which in turn reinforces the idea of a mathematics of revolution.  
CONTRIBUTING FACTORS 
 As revolution spread, there was an understandable need to make sense of the events, and 
to answer questions like Why now? Why these places in this order? What do the revolutions and 
revolutionaries have in common? Scholars of the Arab Spring suggest that a number of factors 
created the impulse for uprising. In countries like Egypt, people experienced denial of their basic 
rights, because the country had been under a state of emergency continuously since 1981, which 
suspended individual rights, and increased police authority and censorship. In combination with 
this, Egypt experienced massive (and often blatant) government corruption. Other Arab nations 
also endured government officials who refused to perform basic services without a bribe, and 
experienced sham elections that left individuals with no voice in their governments. Inhabitants 
in many countries, especially those without oil resources, suffered from widespread poverty, 
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along with a rising cost of living. In some nations, Egypt among them, belated attempts to 
implement neoliberal policies in order to quality for World Bank or WTO aid had eroded food 
subsidies without creating jobs or greater buying power for the population. Many countries 
suffered from very high unemployment. These conditions led to a frustrated, disenfranchised 
population, unable to find work, barely getting by, with no way to make their voices heard and 
who saw no sign of improvement on the horizon.  
 These factors alone do not appear to account for the presence of revolution, however. 
Other factors intersect with those listed above. Many have written about what is called the 
"youth bulge," a disproportionately large number of young people, in Arab countries as a key 
factor in the revolutions. In the Middle East as a whole, roughly a third of the population is under 
25, and Haas and Lesch point out that these bulges are "particularly pronounced in those 
countries that experienced the most widespread and powerful protests," with Tunisia, Libya, 
Egypt, and Syria containing populations under 25 of 42%, 48%, 51%, and 57% respectively (3). 
These populations are hampered by rising unemployment, even when they are highly educated. 
In Egypt, for instance, 60% of 18-29 year olds are among the unemployed (this number is 83% 
for women in that age group), and Egyptian college-educated youth rank the highest for 
unemployment (Gelvin 20). In some countries, marriage is often possible only once financial 
stability is acquired, with the result that many of the unemployed or marginally employed young 
people must delay starting families of their own. Highly educated, unable to find work or start 
families, the young people of the Arab world might easily have felt they had nothing to lose.  
 The high percentage of frustrated young people in countries like Egypt is also significant 
because of the role social media played in the Arab Spring. Protesters organized on Facebook 
and Twitter, and used cellphones on the ground to coordinate large demonstrations. They also 
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used social media to post updates, personal accounts, and videos to the global community. 
Opinions on the significance of social media range from those who would call it a Twitter 
Revolution to those who believe social media was only one factor (and perhaps not the most 
important factor) in bringing about revolution. Scholars like Lynch, for instance, stress that the 
role of social media in protest in Arab countries goes back much further than early 2011 and 
extends beyond Twitter and Facebook. He also argues that because of its popularity, reputation 
for balanced coverage, and accessibility Al-Jazeera likely did more to craft a coherent Arab 
Spring narrative than either Facebook or Twitter.  
 Some things seem obvious, though. Certainly, the youth of these countries were well-
versed in using Twitter, Facebook, and mobile phones, and aware of their potential as 
collaborative tools. For years, dissidents in the Arab world had flocked to the internet because 
they lacked access to forms of political communication like television, radio, or newspapers, and 
because the internet allowed them to direct political criticism anonymously, beyond the range of 
censors or retaliation (Howard and Hussain "Introduction"). In countries with higher internet 
access, individuals were already accustomed to social networking sites and cellphone use, and 
political dissenters were already using digital media to spread criticism and call for change. And 
although some countries blocked popular social media sites, revolutionaries were flexible enough 
to find alternative ways to access these sites, or, as in Libya when Facebook was blocked, to use 
online dating sites to exchange messages about meetings and plans (Howard and Hussain Ch. 1). 
But as Howard and Hussain argue, “It is not that Tunisians and Egyptian decided to have 
political protests and turned to digital media for logistical support” (Ch. 1).  Rather, they looked 
to convenient and familiar platforms in order to organize and connect with one another.  
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 Social media not only allowed artists to plan demonstrations, but also brought them 
support – both from other Arab countries and the wider global community. Activists learned 
from veterans of protests worldwide whose collective experience spanned decades, and who 
were eager to pass tips around. Websites such as boingboing.net helped protesters protect their 
online anonymity and YouTube released its restrictions of violence in videos so state retaliation 
could be broadcast to the world. The Atlantic Monthly had an "Activist Action Plan" translated 
and hosted, and Telecomix circulated a guide for getting around service shut-downs instituted by 
the state (Howard and Hussain Ch. 1). Time published a call to arms, putting volunteers with the 
knowledge to construct ad hoc mobile networks in touch with venture capitalist and tech investor 
Shervin Pishevar (Townsend). 
"THE SHOE-THROWER'S INDEX" 
 So while no single factor may appear likely to have caused the series of protests and 
revolutions, experts soon gathered a list of factors that seemed significant, and as events 
unfolded in first Tunisia and then Egypt, political scholars and media outlets working to 
determine the causes of revolution hoped to use those same significant factors to predict further 
uprisings. If similar factors produced revolution in two countries, why wouldn't unrest spread to 
other countries experiencing similar conditions? Tunisia alone could be an isolated incident, but 
Egypt turned an incident into a trend. Protestors predicted further uprisings with energetic 
optimism, media outlets and global spectators with varying degrees of sympathy and anxiety. As 
The Economist put it in “Variously Vulnerable,” an article published in early February, events in 
Tunisia and Egypt had most of the Arab League’s 22 countries (shown in Figure 1) asking “Who 
will be next?” To answer that question the article focused on Yemen and Sudan, both of which 
had recently seen protesting in the streets, in Yemen to demand the departure of Ali Abdullah 
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Saleh and in Sudan to protest unemployment and the cost of living ("Variously"). Given the 
presence of demonstrations in the street, these two countries seemed like excellent candidates for 
the next revolution. What didn't seem to be up for debate was the question of whether anyone at 
all would be next - the only question was who.  
 Several days later, The Economist published “The Shoe-Thrower’s Index,” a reference 
perhaps to the shoe thrown by a 
journalist at President George 
W. Bush at a 2008 press 
conference in Baghdad. In some 
parts of the world, including the 
Middle East, shoes, especially 
the soles of shoes, can represent 
the dirt they come in contact 
with. Striking someone with a 
shoe, or throwing one at them are 
likely to be taken as insults anywhere, but in some Arab nations even sitting with the soles of 
your shoes facing another person can be considered insulting (Duke). The act represents 
contempt, therefore, and must have seemed a fitting reference to the crowds demanding the 
expulsion of their leaders. The goal of the Index was to predict further uprisings by ranking 17 of 
the Arab League nations by “ascribing a weighting of 35% for the share of the population that is 
under 25; 15% for the number of years the government has been in power; 15% for both 
corruption and lack of democracy as measured by existing indices; 10% for GDP per person; 5% 
for an index of censorship and 5% for the absolute number of people younger than 25” ("Shoe-
Figure 1 "Poor performance," The Economist, February 9, 2011. 
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Thrower's Index"). Although they admit the importance of factors such as unemployment or the 
nebulous "dissent", the Economist does not include these factors because obtaining accurate 
information is so difficult. They end by inviting comments and suggestions. A month later, 
readers were invited to “Build your own revolutionary index” on a revised and interactive 
version of the chart – this time one that included adult literacy rates and percentage of internet 
users. 
 The factors included mirror many of those identified by scholars, but the form the Shoe-
Thrower's Index takes reduces the complexity of revolution to an equation. If a high enough 
percentage of enough factors are present, the country will be a certain percent unstable and thus 
have a certain likelihood of revolution. Although the article admits that it can't be perfect, the 
suggestion is that imperfections are 
the result of inadequate or unavailable 
data. No mention is made of the fact 
that Tunisia (11th, at 50% unstable) is 
ranked considerably below Egypt 
(3rd, with nearly 70% instability).  
The third article in the series 
mentions that since February 9th 
Libya (2nd on their list) and Bahrain 
(13th) have seen unrest, but doesn't 
attempt to explain this. They note that 
since the original index they have 
"added two further indicators that Figure 2 "The shoe-thrower's index," The Economist, March 
14, 2011. 
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were not included in the original ... and made the whole index interactive." While the article 
never says as much, the reader is left with the feeling that the new chart was intended as an 
attempt to refine the equation which failed to predict Bahrain's unrest. And because the new chart 
was interactive, readers could determine for themselves how much weight to place on the 
presence of corruption, or how significant the number of internet users was. The suggestion 
seems to be that while the original chart may have been incomplete, or lacked sufficient 
categories, the idea behind it is solid. Users could work with the new tools, perfecting them.   
 The final version of the Index, shown in Figure 2, shows their "weighted index of unrest" 
from Yemen (86.5) to Qatar (20.7) on the left, and the indicator weights to the right. Each 
category (years in power, % of population under 25, total population under 25, GDP per person, 
democracy ranking, corruption ranking, press freedom ranking, adult literacy, and Internet users) 
has a slider the user can move to determine the importance of the factor. Adjusting one or more 
of these causes the index to shuffle the countries into their new positions. A mouse rollover of 
any country brings up a window with information showing a photograph and name for each 
country's leader and statistics about the country. For instance, rolling over Iraq brings up a photo 
and date of accession for Nuri al-Maliki, the total population (31.3 million, 60.6% of whom are 
under 25), and similar statistics for literacy and internet user. The information on democracy, 
corruption and freedom of press are drawn from a world-wide ranking and so rather than 
percentages or simple numbers the window shows that Iraq ranks 112/167 for Democracy, 
175/178 for Corruption, and 144/196 in Press Freedom ("Build"). None of the information 
provided here, outside of the leader's name and picture, is not also represented by a slider. It is as 
if we know everything we need to know about each country - even a history of other protests 
seems irrelevant under the Index's predictive logic. 
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 Reponses to "Build your own revolutionary index," based on the comments, are telling. 
Some readers posted their own top results, usually sharing the weights they used to achieve these 
results. Comments such as this one - "Not so bad. Still have to find a way to get rid of Yemen" 
(Irinc) are characteristic of this group. Another reader, DGlacia mentions that they "Tried for 
about 10 minutes to make Libya/Yemen/Syria/Egypt/Tunisia/Bahrain my top 6," and offers as 
explanation "Conclusions are: that Bahrain or Oman might be oddities in this list, that the most 
significant parameters might be Years in Power, GDP per capita and adult literacy, and that % of 
population under age 25 and total no. under age 25 are likely to be insignificant." Beneath this 
analysis, almost as an afterthought, the comment reads "Also, there might be other parameters 
that should be considered." This sentiment is shared by a number of readers, who posted 
comments like "If you can't get the right order and size/intensity of unrest, you might have the 
wrong indicators" (Konker) or "hmmm just tried to get Libya Tunisia Egypt and Bahrain as the 
top 4 and couldn't definitely missing some factors" (Corporateanarachist).  
 Other comments go further, offering the missing factors - popular suggestions are income 
gap, unemployment, religious strife, or food and fuel prices. Other suggestions are harder to 
quantify; BrokenPluralist argues that critical factors in Middle Eastern unrest are whether the 
government favors peace with Israel and whether the people perceive that government as a 
Western puppet. Admitting that the latter would be difficult to quantify, he or she adds that 
nonetheless not being perceived as a Western puppet is why there's "no sign of an uprising in 
Syria." Nor is this reader alone in trying to explain Syria's relative quiet at the time of the Index's 
publication, arguments that now seem tragic.  
 What's significant to me here, though, is the mindset adopted by these users of the Index. 
If Syria hasn't risen up, a factor must be wrong or missing. If the top five or six countries don't 
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match reality, the weights need to be adjusted or are skewed by a missing factor. Although 
there's limited curiosity about what might make inhabitants of a seemingly unstable country like 
Syria continue to express their citizenship without revolution, the majority are more concerned 
with "get[ting] rid of Yemen." They easily fall inline with the rhetoric of predictability, where 
citizens react in limited ways to measurable circumstances.  
 LIMITATIONS OF PREDICTION 
 My intention is not to suggest that the factors included in the Index aren't relevant in 
contributing to unrest or in measuring a citizenry's potential for resistance - they certainly are. 
But in examining them we see a particular definition of the contented citizen, and thus of the 
stable country. The Index suggests that stability relies on citizens who are able to participate 
regularly in making decisions about their government, who are not afflicted with crushing 
poverty, and who are kept informed by a relatively unfettered media. The more money they have, 
the freer their news outlets are, and the more democracy they have, the happier citizens must be. 
If good scores in these categories alone led to contented citizens, though, we would expect to see 
the Index and reality line up. As I have suggested throughout this project, though, this is an 
insufficient definition of citizenship, a problem the Index highlights. 
 Even readers who try to bring up the limitations of the Index run into difficulties. One or 
two comments want to see countries outside of the Arab League, especially those enduring under 
similar conditions of economic or democratic deprivation, added to the Index. Given that a 
number of the indicators are concerns in many countries, this seems an odd omission. Similar 
feelings about unemployment, lack of change, and limited economic mobility also characterized 
the U.S.'s Occupy movement, where, again, the role of social media was highlighted. How 
"unstable," according to the Index, are countries that don't appear on this list? 
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 Others attempt to question the very idea of the Index. The Physicist says caustically that 
"the reason the riots started in say Tunisia is because a guy put himself on fire. That's hardly an 
indication that a 10 parameter deterministic toy model could make any predictive sense." 
Leaving aside the equally problematic conclusion expressed here, that a single person's act could 
lead conclusively to a revolution (an idea that is itself as much a media narrative as the idea that 
internet use or a youth bulge drives revolution), the comment nonetheless seems to suggest that 
there's more going on here than a model can represent or predict. Similarly, TheGrimReaper is 
wholly dismissive of the Index, calling it "simply irrelevent [sic]," and adding that "Index-
making is a skewed outlook of a country "vulnerability rate."" Both go on to undermine their 
own points, however. The Physicist adds that making the Index is "like trying to figure out 
whether when you wake up next Tuesday morning you will be feeling up or down and not taking 
into account the weather, which you can't anyway..." And TheGrimReaper adds that "The 
required data aren't completely pooled together and only bits of information supplied by 
governments - sometimes downplayed to elude economic sanctions - are insufficient to gauge the 
potential danger ahead." Both these readers suggest that the Index is a problem, but because it 
requires information which is unavailable, perhaps because governments can't be trusted, perhaps 
because the information itself is unknowable. The Physicist's comment is especially telling 
perhaps, suggesting first that an Index can't measure revolution but then with the metaphor of the 
weather almost immediately falling back into the same language, so that the problem becomes 
less that you can't identify all the factors that go into determining how you will feel, and more 
that you can't get information for all of those factors.  
 There are a number of problems with applying what is almost certainly a Western 
understanding of citizenship to the Arab League nations, but even the largely Western audience 
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commenting on the Index contains these dissenting voices, suggesting that the definition 
presented here is insufficient even in our own culture. But while the factors and weights are 
questioned by the Index's users, and the possibility of crafting an adequate index at all is 
challenged by some dissenting voices, no one seems able to move beyond the idea of an equation 
in talking about revolution as an expression of citizenship.  
 The way of thinking represented by the rhetoric of the Index makes an appearance 
outside of The Economist's comments section. Predicting who would be next also meant 
predicting who wouldn't be next, and while media and protestors constructed a narrative lining 
up Arab nations like dominoes, political figures in the countries that appear on the Index were 
quick to introduce rhetorical moves or propose changes excluding themselves from future 
conflict. Tunisia's revolution began in December 2010, and almost immediately Egyptian 
Foreign Minister Ahmed Aboul Gheit called speculation that the revolution would spread to 
Egypt "nonsense" (Lynch Chapter 4), perhaps unaware that "Kullena Khaled Said" already 
intended to take to the streets in January. In mid-January, mere days before the occupation of 
Tahrir Square, Qaddafi insisted that the internet was all lies, nothing of value was being said 
there, and reports from the internet could not be relied on (globalvoicesonline). Rumors that 
revolution would spread were simply that, and the discerning audience would put no stock in 
them. In hindsight, these comments seem like wishful thinking, but many were aimed at 
encouraging other countries to distance themselves from the revolutions. As Lynch points out, 
"Other countries had good arguments for why they were not like Tunisia: Egypt was larger, 
Saudi Arabia wealthier, Jordan protected by a monarch and fears of Palestinian takeover, Syria 
immune thanks to its regionally popular...foreign policy" (Chapter 4). In response to the 
assumption that they knew what might incite or quell a rebellion, Jordan, Algeria, and Libya 
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lowered taxes or prices on food and imports. These statements and actions seem perfectly in line 
with the logic of the Shoe-Thrower's Index, understanding the ideal conditions of citizenship in 
terms of being provided for and approving of the decisions made by remote authorities, and 
suggesting that if all the variables aren't just right, revolution will not occur.  
 A month after Qaddafi's disparagement of the internet, his son, Sait al-Islam, argued in an 
interview with Libyan state television that "Libyans should not see themselves as Tunisians or 
Egyptians," and that "the situations were totally different" (Lynch Chapter 7), and Syria's Bashar 
al-Assad confidently told the Wall Street Journal that his own reforms had rendered his position 
stable, dismissing the efforts of Arab leaders like Mubarak to placate their citizens by saying "if 
[they] didn't see the need of reform before...it's too late to do any reform" (Lynch Chapter 7). 
The irony of Qaddafi and al-Assad's confidence aside, these statements represent attempts by the 
established leaders to create their own version of the Index. Qaddafi might have expected that 
Libyans would identify with his comments (and later those of his son) and see themselves as "not 
like" Tunisians or Egyptians, and thus not in need of revolution. Similarly, al-Assad's boasts 
invite Syrians to conclude that things might be bad in Egypt, but not in their own country, and 
thus Egypt's need for drastic measures should not be theirs. Even as activists on Twitter were 
developing a revolutionary timetable, presenting uprising as inevitable, these leaders responded 
with a counter-narrative asserting the opposite, acting largely on the same information the 
creators of the Shoe-Thrower's Index used to calculate instability.  
WE ARE ALL KHALED SAID 
 Again, it seems important to stress here that the factors used in the Index and referenced 
by the words and actions of Arab leaders are far from irrelevant. Corrupt officials and sham 
elections are good indications that all is not well, and citizens who live with extreme poverty or 
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without opportunities for gaining employment or supporting a family have every reason to be 
angry. And it certainly seems to be the case that a literate population, young enough to take 
chances, and afforded the means to organize quickly are better able and more likely to participate 
in resistance movements. The point is not to dismiss these conditions, or to deride those who 
attempt to explain or understand revolutions. Instead, I am interested in how these factors come 
to dominate, even to limit, what it means to be a citizen.  
 In contrast, in this section I want to examine some of the ways that protesters used similar 
factors in order to explode the logic behind the Index. While their messages certainly touched on 
familiar topics - unemployment, sham elections and corruption, oppression, living under 
conditions of anxiety and fear - the protestors were uninterested in which country had less 
freedom of press, or whether that freedom should be a large or small factor. Rather they argued 
that citizens in most Arab countries lived under similar, and intolerable conditions, and that all 
should seek something better. Drawing inspiration from the successes around them, expressing 
sympathy for the failures, they used a pan-Arabic rhetoric that encouraged connections across the 
region without diminishing individual differences. 
 These connections were established partially through a shared language. While individual 
Arab League nations may have their own dialect or dialects, in the region as a whole most 
newspapers and news programs use Modern Standard Arabic (MSA). A 1995 study determined 
that less than 1% of media concerned with news or religion in the Arab world used the 
vernacular, making it easy for citizens to receive information about events in geographically 
distant nations (Mellor 124). Because dialect doesn't carry as much cultural prestige, politicians 
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tend to use Standard or Classical Arabic as well, slipping into dialect only occasionally.
12
 
Citizens in the Arab world share a common language, then, which allows communication across 
borders. But the connections created by the revolutionaries go beyond simply using MSA with 
one another. Words and slogans used in one country passed to another, and it was even the case 
that some words specific to the Egyptian dialect were used in countries where the local dialect 
had no such word. Language played a further role, as “Town squares that became the sites of 
protest throughout the Arab world were renamed “Tahrir” square after the main site of protest in 
Cairo,” Gelvin reports (31). The “Day of Rage,” begun by Egyptian protesters was also imitated 
in other countries, so that on any given Friday many countries might hold simultaneous Days of 
Rage.  
 If Tahrir became a way of linking physical sites of resistance, social networking allowed 
for other linked sites. In particular, Google employee Wael Ghonim’s Facebook page for Khaled 
Said. From the beginning, after Said's death at the hands of police in June 2010, the "Kullena 
Khaled Said"
13
 page worked to establish a particular narrative, both about the fate of Said and 
about the lives of other young men in the Arab region. Ghonim positioned his page against a 
similar page: "My Name is Khaled Said," which was (in his opinion) angry, exclusive, and 
extreme. Ghonim's page used nonconfrontational language and was studiedly non-partisan. 
Ghonim’s first post as admin of the site read “Today they killed Khaled. If I don’t act for his 
sake, tomorrow they will kill me,” but others, like “Egyptians, my justice is in your hands,” are 
written from the perspective of Khaled (Ghonim 60). The page called for justice for Said and to 
respond to the Egyptian regime's attempts to excuse Said's death by slandering him (rumors were 
                                                          
12
 Tunisian Ben Ali was known for using MSA exclusively, and in the three speeches he delivered in the 
final weeks of his presidency, he promised first changes in unemployment and regime, and only in his final speech 
spoke to Tunisians in their own dialect, acknowledging their anger and saying to them "I hear you now" (Liberman).  
13
 Arabic for "All of us are Khaled Said." 
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spread that he was hiding drugs, wanted for sexual assault, had evaded his military service, and 
other damning crimes). But the page also called attention to similar abuses by the police, and 
even applauded upstanding police officers. Ghonim’s original goal was to use the page to call for 
an end to police brutality, but the group's goals expanded as the page's popularity grew.  
 "Kullena Khaled Said" also served to link others together in a narrative of recognition 
that extended across the region. Similar pages sprouted in Tunisia and Yemen, and an English 
version (named “We Are All Khaled Said”) allowed far-flung supporters to identify with and 
support Egyptians. As mentioned above, Egypt had been under emergency rule for three decades, 
and many of the page's members would not have remembered a time when they could not be 
arrested for any sign of rebellion or protest. When Ghonim asked members to photograph 
themselves holding signs with the page’s name, hoping to overcome the long-standing fear of 
being identified that resulted from the emergency rule, he was astonished by the response (66). 
Egyptians of all ages and backgrounds participated, but photos were also posted from across the 
region as men and women in other countries sympathized and identified with Said's life, and 
mourned his death. Ghonim recalls that "a pregnant woman sent us an ultrasonographic image of 
her fetus with a caption that read: "My name is Khaled, and I'm coming to the world in three 
months. I will never forget Khaled Said and I will demand justice for his case"" (69). Members 
were able to use the pictures to put very diverse faces to one another, while reinforcing their 
collective goals.  
CONCLUSIONS 
 In conclusion, my objective hasn't been simply to point out that the Economist's "Shoe-
Throwers' Index" doesn't work, or to suggest that the factors used to craft the Index don't matter, 
or don't create the sort of unrest in citizens that ends in protest or revolution. Nor is it to say 
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definitively that the rhetoric used by protesters was simply "better" than that of Arab leaders, or 
stronger than a timely food subsidy. Instead, my interest has been in what the Index, both in what 
it includes, and in what it attempts, tells us about how we define citizenship. The logic of 
mathematics represented here by the Index is one which tries to quantify what citizens want, but 
in doing so it imposes a set of conditions that it argues add up to a contented population. 
Rhetoric argues that in order to persuade, the rhetor must know her audience, and must start from 
where they are.  By contrast, the predictive logic of the Index assumes that only the material 
conditions of citizens' lives mean anything. It cannot even account for the impact of something 
like "Kullena Khaled Said." In falling under the sway of predictive logic, we reduce citizens' 
actions to stimulus response rather than hearing them and being heard by them, and we risk 
buying into a definition of citizenship which fails to take into account their lived experiences.  
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Chapter 5 Toward a Rhetorical Approach to Citizenship 
 My goal in this project has been to make a case for a form of citizenship which exists 
outside of the institutions and processes that officially regulate and encourage civic engagement. 
In doing so, I have employed a definition of citizenship in which citizens share positions of 
stance and judgment about public problems, but do not necessarily do so through official 
channels. The desire to deliberate and work on public issues in this citizenship can occur 
alongside the working of the government, as when individuals or groups make choices about 
their own resource use or lifestyle, or they can occur in opposition to the working of the 
government, as is the case in many protests and revolutions. By this definition, the examples in 
the preceding chapters - Keep Louisville Weird, the WTO demonstrations in Seattle, and the 
Arab Spring - are very much acts of citizenship.  
 In examining these case studies as examples of citizenship, my primary objective has 
been exactly that - to bring them under the umbrella of citizenship. The goal is not to imply, 
however, that these groups are somehow "doing it right" while those dedicated voters who cast 
ballots, or write letters to their representatives are failing in some fashion to perform citizenship 
fully. While it's not my intention to recommend working within the system at all costs, neither is 
it my intention to dismiss those who do.  
 Nor do I want to lionize my examples or exclude similar performances of citizenship with 
agendas I do not sympathize with. I have very real concerns about buying locally, the alliances 
built in Seattle had little staying power, and Egypt (among other Arab League nations) continues 
to experience turmoil. And while I may feel more sympathy for these examples than I do for 
groups who picket abortion clinics, or who profess unconditional love of the Confederacy (as has 
occurred in South Carolina this spring as students protested the College of Charleston's new 
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president while meeting opposition from counter-protesters carrying the stars and bars), their 
drive to participate outside the channels of institutional citizenship is no less valid than that of 
the groups in my case studies.  
 So rather than promoting one group or political agenda over another, the point has been 
to ask to what extent pinning labels like "lifestyle," "battle," "revolution," on these movements 
(and others) prohibits us from examining them as acts of citizenship, and thus keeps us from 
even being able to have a conversation about who is or is not "doing it right." Because they are 
not always recognized as acting as citizens, none can possibly be doing it right, and therefore we 
judge their actions according to how much they do or don't inconvenience us, or how much they 
disagree or agree with us.  
 Instead, the preceding chapters reveal a model of citizenship which demonstrates our 
desire to embrace our situatedness. The participants of the movements described here do not 
want a citizenship disconnected from the places they live, or from their economic conditions and 
everyday choices. They do not want a politics they only observe, or which they influence only 
occasionally, and through strictly regulated channels that many find daunting and inadequate. 
Their voices are made up of, as the slogan goes, their votes, but also any other tool that comes to 
hand. Signs, slogans, and stickers, dance, street theatre, and song, their physical bodies and 
virtual comments, tattoos and Twitter, even fire and broken windows. In sharing their 
convictions with others, and with exploring solutions to problems, they want to utilize all the 
available means. This is, in my mind, a dynamic citizenship, with great potential, but it is often a 
messy citizenship as well. As the case studies also reveal, there are debates about the validity and 
effectiveness of this model of citizenship. Buy local advocates often have little influence in 
official decisions about development, leaving them at the mercy of others. For all its cultural 
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power, when ear X-tacy was finally forced to leave the Highlands, Keep Louisville Weird was 
unable to convince the owners of the building to ensure the next tenant would be a local 
business. Protesters and revolutionaries risk injury, imprisonment, and death, and may also be 
unable to exert much influence. To return to Bordoni's division between the nation and the state, 
a decision to align with the state doesn't mean that we don't still have to live in, and contend 
with, the nation. We may choose to participate outside of institutional citizenship, but we can't 
escape the impact of those institutions, as the "Seattle 600" learned. Operating outside means that 
we risk being dismissed, or directly opposed, because there are not always rights and protections 
associated with extra-institutional citizenship. The question, then, is whether the version of 
citizenship I have described in this project can offer a valid option, when compared to a more 
traditional, institutional model of citizenship?  
 In what follows, I want to discuss some of the reasons behind our preference for 
institutional citizenship, as well as continue the conversation begun in the first chapter about the 
ways that institutional citizenship falls short of its promise. I also want to examine some of our 
reasons for distrusting the extra-institutional citizenship of my case studies. As the preceding 
chapters have likely made clear, the type of citizenship I am describing here is often slow-
moving, and contentious, with no guarantee of success. But I hope to make a case for this slower, 
messier citizenship, and to sketch out some ways that the study of rhetoric can contribute to 
better understanding it.  
ONE PERSON, ONE VOTE 
 In part, it's likely that we are reluctant to expand our definition of citizenship because 
institutional politics at least promises inclusion for all, and shows what appear to be definite and 
measurable results. In theory, with institutional citizenship everyone has equal access to fair 
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treatment under the law, one vote to cast however they wish, and the same potential for real 
world impact. The classic example is, of course, elections, where the will of the people is 
expressed through the tally of votes and the choice of a candidate. The people choose 
representatives at both local and national levels, and if those representatives should somehow 
fail, or the people rethink their choice of them, there are processes in place for overturning 
decisions, impeaching officials, and making requests to the branches of our government. The 
point of all of these processes is to ensure that citizens have a minimum level of access to and 
influence with their government, regardless of class, age (once adulthood is attained), gender, 
race, education, sexuality, or other considerations.  
 Citizenship in this system is a collection of rights, including the right to participate in 
government by choosing representatives. This means that citizens have an incentive to 
participate, inasmuch as they wish to protect or expand their rights, and that would-be 
representatives have an incentive to respond to their constituents, inasmuch as they wish to gain 
or remain in office. Individual rights are established, interpreted, revised, and protected by a host 
of other institutions, and citizens agree to abide by them, treating one another with tolerance, if 
not with acceptance.   
 In the realm of institutional citizenship, change most often occurs through election, as the 
body of citizens replaces its representatives with others that seem better able to serve their needs. 
But increasingly, as we have come to focus more on citizenship as a collection of rights, 
litigation has become a powerful tool for social change. In her book, Rights Talk, Mary Ann 
Glendon argues that ours has always been a society heavily influenced by the law and lawyers, 
and this has led to a particularly strong culture of personal rights. Rights culture intensified, 
Glendon says, in the decades following World War II, as advocates for social change turned to 
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the courts in order to combat the institutionalized racism or sexism of some of our laws. A 
political sphere dominated by well-financed groups, and the growing tendency of politicians to 
take a moderate stance have only reinforced the notion that the courts are the best place for 
citizens to achieve substantial change. 
 On the surface, this is all to the good. For many of us, an interest in personal rights 
reflects our investment in personal liberty, and a desire to see justice done. Abolishing laws 
which allow the exploitation or mistreatment of others, and establishing laws which extend 
protection to previously excluded groups are admirable goals. Moreover, the realm of litigation, 
especially in a diverse society like ours, where it is difficult to establish a single dominant public 
view on any issue, can lead to quicker and more definitive victories than the quarrelsome, 
compromise-hampered realm of politics.  
LIMITATIONS OF INSTITUTIONAL CITIZENSHIP 
 Without dismissing the benefits of rights-based citizenship or litigation as a tool for 
social change, though, I want to consider how they also show the limitations of institutional 
citizenship. There are drawbacks to imagining our citizenship primarily as a collection of 
individual rights. In the Rhetoric, it is Aristotle who argues that we require rhetoric in part 
because while we may endeavor to create a just system of law, it is impossible to craft laws 
which cover every possibility (1.13.13). Even if it were, not everyone will agree about what 
constitutes justice or injustice, and in referring to "fairness" as "justice that goes beyond the 
written law" (1.13.13) Aristotle points out the limitations of simply determining whether 
someone has the right to do something or not. What we may do is not necessarily what we ought 
to do.  
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 Glendon echoes this by asserting that our responsibilities to one another get buried in 
rights. It is easy to see how this might happen. Some demand the right to practice or espouse 
their faith while others demand the right to an education or workplace free of the faiths of others. 
In the heated conversations around the Affordable Care Act, we have grown accustomed to 
hearing some employees demand the right to decide for themselves whether they seek certain 
medical care (such as contraception) while employers demand the right not to provide services 
they are morally opposed to. Debates over how to handle bullying become debates about what 
school-age students have a right to do and say to one another, debates about what protections 
they are entitled to, and where the lines between them should be drawn. In 2011, for example, 
after the Kentucky House Education Committee passed a bill extending protection from bullying 
to gay students, Representative Mike Harmon wanted to amend the bill to protect the right of 
religious students to express their disapproval of homosexuality. His proposed amendment 
allowed for any expression short of physical damaging gay, lesbian, or bisexual students or their 
property (Chrislove). The question of how Kentucky students ought to treat one another is lost in 
a scuffle to ensure that no one's rights are stepped on.  
 Those of us who teach undoubtedly see a similar sleight of hand when we attempt to 
introduce controversial issues in the classroom. I have often assigned readings criticizing or 
promoting buy-local movements, and asked my students for a response. Those who disagree with 
the movements frequently discuss their right to shop wherever they please. Although it is less 
common, some who support the movements use the same language to suggest that they have a 
right to more diverse shopping experiences in their cities, but they struggle to provide a rebuttal 
to their peers' insistence on the right to promiscuous shopping. They are keenly aware that it is 
vital not to violate the rights of others, including, of course, the right of others to a personal 
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opinion. Just as my students find that talk of rights often closes down rhetorical exchange, 
Glendon observes that rights talk "[forecloses] further communication with those whose points 
of view differ from our own," because "the language of rights is the language of no compromise. 
The winner takes all and the loser has to get out of town. The conversation is over" (Glendon 9).  
 There are other problems with the promise of electoral and legislative politics. In spite of 
the equality and inclusion institutions seem to promise, the reality is often otherwise. For many 
of us, there is a gap between the promise of legal and political equality, and the realization of 
equality. As mentioned in the first chapter, T.H. Marshall's often-cited essay, “Citizenship and 
Social Class,” divides citizenship into three elements: civil, political, and social. Civil citizenship 
is composed of those “rights necessary for individual freedom," such as “liberty of the person, 
freedom of speech, thought, and faith,” the rights to justice and to own property and enter into 
contracts (10). Political citizenship gives us the right to participate politically, either by holding 
political office, or by electing those who hold office. Civil citizens are guaranteed certain 
protections, and political citizens are permitted to help shape the policies of the world they live 
in. These elements encompass much of what I refer to when I reference the electoral and legal 
politics that we are most comfortable associating with citizenship. Social citizenship is more 
tricky. For Marshall it consists of “the whole range from the right to a modicum of economic 
welfare and security to the right to share to the full in the social heritage and to live […] 
according to the standards prevailing in the society” (11). Social citizenship is a crucial element 
because while civil rights bestow certain legal powers on citizens, the use of those powers is 
“drastically curtailed by class prejudice and lack of economic opportunity,” and political rights 
provide citizens with a “potential power whose exercise demand[s] experience, [and 
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]organisation“ (46). This point of view recognizes that without the means to participate fully in a 
society, being technically granted the right to do so is unhelpful.  
 Sixty years later, Marshall's observations remain relevant. Saskia Sassen argues that "the 
principle of equal citizenship remains unfulfilled," because "Groups defined by race, ethnicity, 
religion, sex, sexual orientation, and other 'identities' still face various exclusions from full 
participation in public life. This is especially so at the level of practices even in the face of 
changes in the formal legal status...In brief, legal citizenship does not always bring full and equal 
membership rights because those rights are often conditioned by the position of different groups 
within a nation state"  ("Incompleteness" 239). There is still a sizeable gap between the legal and 
political rights we are granted and how fully we are able to enjoy them. Each citizen is entitled to 
vote, and voting costs nothing, but this right is available only to citizens with a permanent 
residence, and increasingly, only to citizens with the proper form of identification. Recently 
proposed photo identification laws, cited as necessary to reduce voter fraud, are likely to reduce 
voter turnout among the young, elderly, and disabled, particularly when they hail from the lower 
economic classes. Similarly, debates over extending voting hours to include weekends remind us 
that not all citizens have equal command over their transportation, work schedules, and child 
care. If I can vote, but am unable to get to my polling station without risking my employment, 
exercising this right becomes significantly more expensive. And while anyone may aspire to 
public office, wealth heavily influences the outcome of elections, putting candidates with fewer 
funds at a disadvantage. Institutions that traditionally worked in support of candidates friendly to 
the working class, such as unions, have declined in power, while super PACs supported by 
extremely wealthy individuals and corporations dominate elections.  
102 
 
 Similarly, our civil citizenship is curtailed without social equality. The right to own 
property, as Marshall puts it, is only the right "to acquire it if you can, and to protect it, if you 
can get it," while "freedom of speech has little real substance if, from lack of education, you have 
nothing to say that is worth saying and no means of making yourself heard if you say it" (35). 
Just as importantly, as our rights expand, it becomes more likely that without a certain level of 
education, or access to legal counsel, citizens may be unaware that their rights have been 
violated. Increasingly, as public schools falter, adequate education is the result of economic 
class, and both legal counsel and litigation can cost a great deal  in terms of money and time. For 
Marshall, the solution to these inequalities is institutions fostering social citizenship, which grant 
minimum levels of education, and access to health care, food, housing, and income. Under 
neoliberal globalization, though, social services in the United States have been eroded, so that 
social citizenship has fallen significantly behind its civil and political siblings.  
 Even if we acquire sufficient social citizenship, electoral and legislative politics can be 
very isolating. At the national level, issues often seem remote, and our own voice or vote can be 
lost in the sheer size of a diverse population. This is complicated, argues Hauser, by a media 
which reduces complex issues to sound bites, and substitutes "raw response" for discourse (2). 
Media outlets gather information through phone polls (we might add Twitter and Facebook) and 
present the results to us as graphics, statistics, or sample quotations that offer little opportunity 
for discussion or reflection (2). We are isolated from one another, encountering "the public as a 
faceless, anonymous body whose members are reduced to the number having selected 
predetermined choices to a poller's questions and who enter our homes as media reports of data" 
(4). In my own experience, watching friends respond moment-to-moment on Facebook or 
Twitter to the 2012 presidential debates, commentary is vivid, pointed, humorous - but fleeting. 
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While these social media sites do allow for more sustained discussion, it is less common; the 
live-tweeter who pauses to unpack something or debate a point risks falling behind, missing out 
on an opportunity to comment on the next thing. 
 Fleming's City of Rhetoric also describes the isolation of electoral and legislative politics, 
arguing that we often conceptualize citizenship as national, and thus too large for us to 
comfortably manage. In contrast, he adds, we view local politics as an alternative, but find this 
isolating in a different way. At the local level, given the homogeneity of our neighborhoods, it is 
less likely that we will grapple with real difference. We are caught between a politics too big for 
us, where issues are too complex to be fully grasped and our vote seems meaningless, and a 
politics too small for us, where we are isolated from citizens "not like us."   
 Legislative politics in particular can cut us off from others, partially, as Glendon notes, 
by making the individual's rights primary in our citizenship. But legislative politics can also 
reduce our participation by moving the question of what should be done into the courts. As an 
example, the last few years have seen an increase in rulings in many states over whether to 
recognize or permit same-sex marriages, and as a supporter of marriage equality, I have been 
keenly interested in the outcome of these rulings. When my schedule and circumstances permit, I 
watch the news, and when they don't, I check my phone at intervals for text messages and 
Facebook posts with updates. Watching these rulings unfold from a space like Facebook, 
however, demonstrates the political alienation scholars like Hauser and Fleming are describing. I 
encounter the rest of the country as those who favor or oppose a decision that it often feels none 
of us will decide - they become percentages on a poll, or those who do and do not circulate 
memes supporting or mocking a proposed change. And though I can, and do, interact with those 
individuals where they appear in my real or virtual networks, in many ways I am, as Fleming 
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notes, "little more than a spectator of it" (38). My colleagues, friends, and I are observers, 
waiting for someone else, somewhere else, to validate or reject our values, and in spite of the 
excitement of awaiting the ruling, and the triumph we may feel if we welcome the outcome, 
there is still a sense of powerlessness. Unless we happen to be a person of interest in these cases, 
our role is to accept the ruling, even if we "accept" it by denouncing it. Few of us will ever be 
involved in any appeals to these rulings, either. Like spectators at a basketball game, we might 
be annoyed with a referee, or yell at the coach to contest a call, but we are doing so from a 
distance, unable to influence the situation.  
 Many of the issues which most concern us, moreover, are not automatically subject either 
to electoral or legal politics. Dana Cloud points out that facets of our lives where we are most 
vulnerable, like economic relations, are largely excluded from formal politics, with the result that 
we have little or no power to make decisions about our economic lives. As she points out, "We 
do not vote over our wages, work hours, employment benefits, or the accessibility of child care 
and health care," because under capitalism these are considered private, rather than public 
concerns (164). How can we achieve measurable change as individual voters, when these 
concerns exist outside institutional boundaries?   
 The rights based citizenship that has grown from electoral and legislative politics, at least 
in its current manifestation, can be rhetorically disabling, then. If rhetoric deals with the 
uncertain, where there are questions about what the problem is, or what ought to be done about 
the problem, these politics shut down rhetorical exchange and move us away from those 
questions toward statements about what the law does or does not permit. The process stops being 
one of discussing and finding solutions to public problems, or of determining our responsibilities 
to one another as members of a community, and becomes one of determining an individual's 
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right to marry, to receive benefits, to visit a hospitalized partner or spouse, to adopt or protect 
their children. While obtaining these rights is no small thing, I want to suggest that it isn't 
everything. Rights-based citizenship may grant me the freedom to marry my partner, but it 
cannot grant me the respect of my fellow citizens. Tolerance is not integration. As 
Representative Harmon's amendment demonstrates, we tolerate situations only until we have the 
power to change them, or until the cost of enduring them outweighs the cost of acting on them. 
And, as the last few presidential elections have proven, the definitiveness of electoral politics 
does little to promote cooperation. Electoral and legislative politics give us neat, concrete 
answers to questions, but cannot assist us in living productively with those answers.  
"JUST TALK" 
 These discrepancy between the promise of institutional citizenship and the reality are the 
reason for my belief that we need a way of thinking about and talking about citizenship that 
encompasses extra-institutional participation. If the examples in this project are all ways of being 
citizens, though, why are we confused or hostile about them? What explains our reluctance to 
include activities that can't be easily institutionalized? 
 In the case of protests, strikes, and other demonstrations, it is not hard to see where 
hostility comes from. Residents of Seattle trying to get to work or school were likely as 
displeased as the WTO delegates to be stopped by human chains, signs of protest, and dancing 
sea turtles. Others, out trying to complete Christmas shopping or enjoy dinner at a restaurant 
during the demonstrations, ran the risk of being injured by police or protesters, and clouds of gas 
drifted into areas not officially included in the protest. Whether the windows broken during the 
demonstrations constitute "violence" or not, they were nonetheless illegal acts, and it is 
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unsurprising if the majority of citizens do not recognize actions which break the law as part of a 
legitimate citizenship.  
 On the other end of the spectrum, though, it is possible that the everydayness of this 
citizenship sometimes has a hand in de-legitimizing it. Voting and jury duty are activities we 
perform only at intervals - sometimes very long intervals - as opposed to purchasing goods and 
services, which we may undertake on a daily basis. These practices can be easily divorced from 
their potential for political significance. It is possible to shop locally unintentionally (merely 
because it is convenient) or to do so without identifying with a movement, but no one 
accidentally participates in an election. There is a purposefulness and exceptionalness to these 
activities which makes it easier to identify them as part of our civic lives, as opposed to our 
private lives.  
  Even when participants identify as members of a movement with an articulated political 
agenda, it is unclear, to many, what these extra-institutional acts of citizenship accomplish. This, 
Jacobs, Cook, and Carpini suggest, is why we are so skeptical of discursive participation, which 
is often dismissed as "just talk" (3). Instead, even as we find institutional citizenship alienating or 
insufficient, they argue that we nonetheless yearn for the "institutional guarantees found in 
electoral or legislative politics" (3), such as clear and measurable results. Unlike casting a vote in 
an election, it is harder to measure the failure or success of "your side" when buying locally or 
protesting. The insistence, in the case of Seattle, to measure success or failure by determining 
what caused the Millennium Round of talks to fail (assuming you accept the premise of their 
failure) is a manifestation of this need for measurable results. Some participants of these 
movements comfort themselves with the knowledge that their actions will raise awareness, but 
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many of us require more tangible goals. Without something to point to, it is easy to become 
disillusioned. 
 Nor does extra-institutional citizenship escape the same problems of access and influence 
I referenced above in institutional citizenship. There are very real issues of class, gender, and 
race in the examples I've chosen. The realities of buying locally often mean that participants are 
limited to those able to live and shop in vibrant, middle-class neighborhoods - and it is telling 
that while Keep Louisville Weird has shaped the faces of the Highlands and Crescent Hill, it 
hasn't achieved much presence in downtown Louisville itself, or neighborhoods with similar 
conditions of poverty. Louivillians, as seen through this movement, are between 25 and 50, 
white, and middle-class. Similarly, critics have pointed out the "lack of color" in Seattle
14
 
(Martinez). While the demonstrations drew participants from around the world, the majority of 
those protesting in Seattle's streets were young and white, and quite a few were financially 
stable. Speaking for myself, although I could have managed to get time off from work in 1999, 
and perhaps I could even have scraped together the travel fare, it would have been a crippling 
blow to my finances for months afterward. In general, I lacked the funding and free time to travel 
across the country. Moreover, I only knew of the events at all because friends in the city 
telephoned me - in the pre-smart-phone days of the late 90s, only members of the middle class 
would have had the ready internet access necessary to stay informed and involved in planning 
the demonstrations. Even in Egypt, where poverty and unemployment are often very high, the 
"face" of the Arab Spring revolutionary for most Americans was a young man, college-educated, 
English-speaking, and tech-savvy. The "Twitter revolution" assumed a certain level of access 
and familiarity with technology. Even if many of us believe in these movements, not all of us 
have the capacity to participate in them.  
                                                          
14
 A criticism that emerged again with Occupy Wall Street. 
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SO WHY BOTHER?  
 The practices of extra-institutional citizenship are not only uncertain, but also contentious 
- as my case studies demonstrate. The everydayness of some practices causes them to be lost in 
the sea of personal choices, while practices such as emotional speech, picketing, sit-ins and 
occupations - even when they are peaceful and legal - may inconvenience or discomfit others. 
Reactions to these practices can range from indifference or dismissal, through scorn, anger, and 
verbal attacks, all the way to physical attacks, imprisonment, and beyond.  
 This is not to say that our politics now is never contentious; it is, of course. But this 
contention is managed and mitigated by the institutions that determine and protect our rights, and 
it is held in check by our recognition of one another as citizens. We may dislike or criticize those 
who vote for candidates we oppose, but we do not call for their arrest, or argue that what they do 
is meaningless. Even those who accuse Green Party and other Independent supporters of 
"wasting" their votes acknowledge through this criticism that these voters can affect the outcome 
for other candidates. Given the political atmosphere of the last decade, of decreased bipartisan 
cooperation, and increased voter frustration with bickering politicians, we might wonder whether 
further conflict is really what's needed. 
 There are reasons to embrace contention, however, and to view it as potentially 
productive. As much as we might aspire to the unified state embodied in the phrase "We The 
People," Allen argues that it is "wholeness, not oneness," which should function as our guiding 
principle, and that we should be asking "what modes of citizenship can make a citizenry whole 
without covering up difference?" (19). In avoiding conflict, we often silence others, because 
disagreement is avoided by asking others to be reasonable, a request that tends to rely on a 
definition of reason that codes anything emotional as "unreasonable." This request polices our 
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responses, and ignores the possibility that outrage or sorrow may be the most appropriate 
response to a public problem. The request to be reasonable ties our hands and tells us to get out 
of the streets and go on enduring the foreclosure of our homes or the loss of our public libraries 
while we move slowly through the official channels. In other circumstances, the desire to avoid 
conflict leads us to make consensus our top priority. When this is the case, we don't enter into 
negotiation planning to do the least harm to the environment, or to benefit the greatest number of 
people, or even to expose one another to the full range of positions, but simply to find solutions 
we all agree on. These are likely to be few, and minor, leaving all participants with the sensation 
that nothing has changed.  
 Disagreement is not necessarily a sign that we have a problem, and in fact can be a sign 
that we live in a vibrant and healthy democracy. The discursive practices of a healthy democracy 
should include debate, questions, even challenges and demands. A citizenry that disagrees with 
one another, and with their representatives, on public issues is a citizenry engaged with those 
issues and better prepared for democratic participation. Will Kymlicka argues that "the ability 
and willingness to engage in public discourse about matters of public policy, and to question 
authority" are "perhaps the most distinctive aspects of citizenship in a liberal democracy" (296). 
It is exactly the question of whether we are willing and able to argue with one another that 
prompts Marshall to insist on the necessity of social citizenship, and which leads Willey to argue 
that residents who don't know or care about local issues and elections have stopped being 
citizens. Hauser says simply "a democratic rhetoric is untidy" (273).  
 For all its messiness, dispute and disagreement can also be rewarding. In grappling with 
difficult issues we come to better understand the positions and motivations of those around us, 
and we are forced to better articulate our own positions and the motivations behind them. Only 
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through engaging with others can we begin "moving from purely private preoccupations to the 
formation of judgments related to pressing issues of common concern" (Jacobs et al Ch. 1). We 
are able to include not only questions of individual rights and responsibilities, but questions 
about how best to live with one another, pursuing our often very different goals while respecting 
those who disagree with us. If the relative tidiness of institutional politics has led to isolation and 
apathy for many citizens, there may be reason to consider the benefits of messiness.  
SITUATING THIS PROJECT 
 The rhetorical approach I have taken in this project has something to offer the field of 
citizenship studies. Within this field, there is a divide concerning what citizenship means, and 
how it should be defined. On one side of this divide, we find theorists like Peter Levine, who 
argue for a largely political definition of citizenship, one where our civic identities are framed 
around actions. On the other side are thinkers like Richard Bellamy, for whom citizenship is 
more about a legal status. Although both believe in the importance of civic engagement, one side 
images citizenship as something one does while the other imagines it as something we are.  
 Both sides are also concerned with citizenship as it relates to the nation-state, and its 
institutions. Particularly as questions are raised about whether the increasingly porous national 
borders for capitalism have resulted in a "post-citizen" world, or whether they will invite a new 
global citizenship. How, scholars in citizenship studies ask, can we foster greater civic 
engagement?  
 While both Levine and Bellamy are interested in whether, how, and how often citizens 
participate, they are less interested in how citizens view their own actions, and how they frame 
themselves as engaged citizens both inside and outside of institutions. Attention to how citizens 
view themselves, and how their discursive practices shape what it means to be a citizen is 
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something rhetorical studies can contribute to scholarship about citizenship. It asks us, as I have 
argued here, to expand what we think citizenship can means, and opens the study of citizenship 
up to look more closely at alternative ways of working together on public problems.  
 In each of my examples, our reluctance to view the movements as citizenship causes us to 
frame them in ways that cut participants off from one another, denying them a collective political 
identity. In Louisville, those who support Keep Louisville Weird are framed as customers rather 
than citizens, seen as exercising personal choices in consumption instead of working together to 
shape the life of their city. In Seattle, accounts on both sides focus on the personal reasons 
protesters had for being in the streets. They acquire a shared identity as soldiers (who follow the 
orders of a superior) or as dupes (who have bought into messages disseminated by another), but 
no shared identity that allows them political agency. And attempts to make sense of the Arab 
Spring such as the Shoe-Throwers' Index reduce citizens of Arab League nations to a sameness 
equally disabling - all become part of a faceless, nameless mass that reacts to a set of material 
conditions in the same way across all borders and differences. To pay attention to the ways that 
these participants frame themselves as engaged citizens expands what citizenship can mean, and 
grants political agency to these groups, allowing their voices to be better heard. 
 This means that a rhetorical approach to citizenship has value outside of academia, as 
well. I argued above that legal and electoral politics are well-suited to telling us the results of 
decisions, but not as useful for helping us live with those decisions. It is here that I believe 
rhetorical studies has something to offer, by providing an approach to politics and our place in it 
willing to embrace uncertainty and disagreement, without viewing one another as enemies, or 
misguided dupes. The art of rhetoric is not one of manipulating an unthinking and unreflective 
audience, but one of "putting as persuasive an argument as possible to an audience and then 
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leaving actual choices of action to them" (Allen 141). In order to take a rhetorical approach, we 
must be prepared to trust those we attempt to persuade, rather than viewing them as evil, or as 
enemies to be thwarted at all costs. We must be prepared to make our cases, or defend our 
positions, in terms which will be understood by and compelling to others who may come to the 
bargaining table with from places very different from our own. In order to persuade them, we 
will need to understand, as best we can, what their concerns and hopes are likely to be. 
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 This dissertation argues for a more inclusive definition of citizenship by suggesting that it 
is best understood as the ability and desire to work on public problems with others. In the 
Westphalian nation-state, citizenship is often understood to be a collection of legal and political 
rights determined and administered through institutions. These institutions fail to account for the 
desire of individuals to express convictions and work on problems that they experience locally. 
Our lived experience of citizenship exceeds the boundaries of institutions, but these actions are 
often dismissed as a result of the rhetoric used to talk about citizenship and public problems. The 
argument examines three examples - consumption, protest, and revolution - through the Keep 
Louisville Weird movement, the 1999 demonstrations against the WTO in Seattle, and the Arab 
Spring. Only by including acts such as these, not normally recognized as citizenship, can we 
construct a definition of citizenship that takes into account the lived experiences of citizens.
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